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INTRODUCrION
Limited liability in tort has been the prevailing rule for corporations in the
United States, as elsewhere, for more than a century. This rule is generally
acknowledged to create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting
corporations to avoid the full costs of their activities. Nevertheless, these
incentives are conventionally assumed to be the price of securing efficient
capital financing for corporations. Although several authors have recently
proposed curtailing limited liability for certain classes of tort claims or for
certain types of corporations in order to control its worst abuses, even the most
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radical of these proposals retains limited shareholder liability as the general
rule.'
Surprisingly, given the widespread acceptance of the prevailing rule, the
existing literature contains no comprehensive comparison of the consequences
of limited and unlimited liability for corporate torts? We offer such an analysis
here. We argue, contrary to the prevailing view, that limited liability in tort
cannot be rationalized for either closely-held or publicly-traded corporations
on the strength of the conventional arguments offered on its behalf. In fact,
there may be no persuasive reasons to prefer limited liability over a regime of
unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts. The question remains
open chiefly because the merits of limited liability depend, as we demonstrate,
on empirical issues that are difficult to resolve on the basis of available evi-
dence. At a minimum, however, we conclude that the burden is now on the
proponents of limited liability to justify the prevailing rule.
The topic is timely and important. Changes in technology, knowledge,
liability rules, and procedures for mass tort litigation have for the first time
raised the prospect of tort claims that exceed the net worth of even very large
corporations. Environmental harms, such as oil spills or the release of toxic
materials, are one potential source of massive liability; hazardous products and
carcinogens in the workplace are others. At the same time, the mergers and
acquisitions movement of the past decade has converted many large corpora-
l. E.g., P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW 681-92 (1987) (suggest-
ing abolition of limited liability among firms within "corporate groups"); Dent, Limited Liability in
Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 151, 178 (1991) (proposing a "reasonable prudence" test
for imposing limited liability on controlling shareholders); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic
Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.L 117, 148-49 (1980) (advocating
unlimited liability for small, closely-held corporations, in both tort and contract, and suggesting that directors
of large, publicly-traded corporations be made personally liable to involuntary creditors); Schwartz, Products
Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 .
LEGAL STUD. 689, 716-17 (1985) (advocating abolition of limited liability for "knowable tort risks," though
without specifying whether shareholders or only directors should be personally liable in an alternative
regime); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 74
(1980) (advocating abrogation of limited liability for criminal penalties, punitive damage awards, and
"perhaps even civil liabilities arising under federal statutes whose policies do not appear fully discharged
by compensation"); Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?,
76 YALE LJ. 1190 (1967) (advocating unlimited liability for closely-held corporations); M. Adams,
Ownership, Control and Limited Liability (undated) (on file with authors) (advocating veil-piercing to
controlling shareholders for corporations shown to have been established with negative net expected social
value); D. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors (undated) (Center for Law & Economic
Studies, Columbia University School of Law, Working Paper No. 48) (advocating abrogation of limited
liability for corporate subsidiaries).
2. Most of the thoughtful literature addressing the rationale for limited liability focuses principally on
corporate liability to contract creditors. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U. CHiL. L. REV. 89 (1985); Halper, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 1; Woodward, Limited
Liability in the Theory of the Firm, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECoN. 601 (1985). The most
notable exceptions are P. BLUMBERG, supra note 1 and D. Leebron, supra note 1. Both Leebron and
Blumberg, like us, are skeptical of the case for limited liability in tort, and for some of the same reasons.
Unlike us, however, Leebron is ultimately persuaded of the efficiency of limited liability for both closely-
held and publicly-traded firms, while Blumberg apparently wishes to retain limited liability for shareholders
who are individuals or otherwise not members of corporate groups.
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tions that were formerly publicly-traded into highly leveraged closely-held
firms; these firms, which have proportionately small net assets and are under
great pressure to maximize cash flow, have an unusually strong incentive to
engage in excessively risky behavior.
Already, strong empirical evidence indicates that increasing exposure to tort
liability has led to the widespread reorganization of business firms to exploit
limited liability to evade damage claims. The method of evasion differs by
industry. For example, placing hazardous activities in separate subsidiaries
seems to be the dominant mode of insulating assets in the tobacco and hazard-
ous waste industries. 3 In contrast, disaggregating or downsizing firms seems
to be the primary strategy for avoiding liability in the chemical industry and,
more recently, in the oil transport industry.4 Indeed, one study finds that, over
the past twenty-five years, a very large proportion of small firms entering all
hazardous industries in the United States are motivated primarily by a desire
to avoid liability for consumer, employee, and environmental harms.5
The Article begins, in Part I, by comparing limited and unlimited liability
in the context of closely-held firms. Part II extends this comparison of liability
regimes to the special problems presented by publicly-traded firms. Part III
reviews liability evasion strategies that might distort the incentive effects of
unlimited liability. In Part IV, we emphasize that, in contrast to the convention-
al analysis, shareholder liability should be viewed as a problem of tort law and
not as a problem of corporate law. We also note that limited liability should
be retained as the basic rule for contractual creditors, and we discuss the
problems of distinguishing between tort creditors and contract creditors. Part
V examines prior experience with unlimited liability and the historical evolution
of limited liability. Finally, Part VI explains why more modest reforms, such
as expanded director and officer liability for corporate torts, mandatory insur-
ance, or more liberal veil-piercing, appear inferior to a general regime of
unlimited shareholder liability.
3. See M. Lange, Corporate Strategies for Evading Environmental and Tort Liability 17-19 (March
1991) (Harvard Law School mimeo) (on file with authors). As Lange notes, both tobacco and environmental
services firms have publicly acknowledged that the purpose of subsidiarization has been to evade tort
liability. Id. at 18-19. For example, Phillip Morris created its holding company "to better insulate each
business from obligations and liabilities incurred in unrelated activities.' id. at 18 (citing Scredon &
Galberson, Tobacco Companies Are in the Fight for Their Lives, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 58, 59).
4. See M. Lange, supra note 3, at 22-25. In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Shell Oil
Company has recently announced plans to employ independent contractors to transport crude oil in order
to insulate itself from potential liability for oil spills. Id. at 21 (citing Cook, An Easy Way Out of This Mess,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 25, 1990, at 14, 15).
5. Ringleb & wiggins, Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards, 98 1 POL. ECON. 574 (1990).
More particularly, Ringleb and wiggins find that, between 1967 and 1980, the rate of formation of small
firms increased noticeably, in comparison with overall industrial trends, in those industries characterized
by relatively hazardous activities. (They do not report how many of these small firms are subsidiaries of
larger firms and how many are free-standing.) Ringleb & Wiggins conclude from this that tort liability may
not be a good way to control hazardous industrial activity. But one might just as easily, and perhaps more
obviously, conclude that it is time to reexamine the rule of limited liability.
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The economic argumentation in Part I of the Article may strike some
readers as abstract; those readers might wish to move through this discussion
quickly and reserve most of their attention for the material that follows, which
focuses on concerns of a more institutional nature.
I. CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
For clarity of analysis and exposition, we begin by analyzing the conse-
quences of limited liability for the simplest types of corporate structures and
then proceed to examine progressively more complex cases.
A. Corporations with a Single Shareholder
Consider first the situation in which a single person forms a corporation,
of which she is the sole shareholder and manager, to exploit an investment
opportunity. The shareholder in this case could be an individual or-more
realistically and more importantly-another firm of which the corporation in
question is a wholly-owned subsidiary. Suppose that undertaking the investment
creates a risk of tort liability exceeding the corporation's net value. Assume,
moreover, that the shareholder's personal assets are larger than any potential
liability that the corporation might incur (an assumption we shall relax below).
1. With Risk Neutrality
Finally, assume that the corporation's single shareholder is risk neutral-an
assumption that is reasonable when the shareholder is a parent corporation, even
if it is unrealistic when the shareholder is an individual.
6
Under these circumstances, it is easy to see that a rule of limited share-
holder liability for corporate torts creates incentives for several forms of
inefficient behavior.
a. Incentives to Misinvest
The most familiar inefficiency created by limited liability is the incentive
it provides for the shareholder to direct the corporation to spend too little on
precautions to avoid accidents.7 In contrast, a rule of unlimited liability induces
6. There are several reasons why a parent corporation is likely to be risk neutral. First, it may have
total assets that are relatively large compared with the potential tort damage exposure of the subsidiary firm.
Second, the parent may have a number of other subsidiaries or divisions engaged in projects whose risks
are largely uncorrelated so that, as a consequence of diversification, it bears little risk in aggregate. And
third, the parent may well be a publicly-traded firm whose tort risk can largely be eliminated by its
stockholders through diversification of their shareholdings.
7. See Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT' REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986); Appendix, infra
note 9. The Appendix illustrates the effects of a rule of strict liability. Shavell shows similar results can
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the socially efficient level of expenditure on precautions by making the share-
holder personally liable for any tort damages that the corporation cannot pay.
Further, limited liability encourages overinvestment in hazardous industries.
Since limited liability permits cost externalization, a corporation engaged in
highly risky activities can have positive value for its shareholder, and thus can
be an attractive investment, even when its net present value to society as a
whole is negative.' Consequently, limited liability encourages excessive entry
and aggregate overinvestment in unusually hazardous industries.
Finally, limited liability may induce the shareholder either to overinvest or
to underinvest in her individual firm-that is, to pick either too large or too
small a scale for the firm. This scale effect is ambiguous because investing in
the firm under limited liability has two different consequences for potential tort
liability that operate in opposite directions. On the one hand, limited liability
partially externalizes the marginal increase in tort damages caused by expansion
of the firm and thus creates an incentive for excessive investment. On the other
hand, increased investment increases the value of the firm, and hence the
amount that is available to pay damages to all tort claimants, including those
who would have been injured even without the new investment. Consequently,
limited liability also creates an incentive to minimize investment in order to
reduce the exposure of the firm's owner to tort damages. Although in most
cases the second effect is likely to dominate the first, and hence lead to too
small a scale for the firm, there may also be situations in which the reverse is
true.9
be derived for a negligence rule.
8. See Shavell, supra note 7; Appendix, infra note 9.
9. The second effect is likely to dominate the first, and hence lead to underinvestment at the level of
the firm, where the firm's activities resultin arelatively large probability of damages that do not substantial-
ly exceed the firm's value. A prototypical example might be a small taxicab company that runs a consider-
able risk of injuring motorists or pedestrians. If the company adds another cab to its fleet, some of the
resulting increase in expected accident costs will be externalized by limited liability. This is the first effect,
which will create an incentive to add the cab. But adding another cab will also increase the amount of assets
available to satisfy a tort judgment from an accident involving any of the company's existing cabs, and this
second effect will increase the cost of operating the company's existing fleet. In this situation, the latter
effect is likely to outweigh the first, resulting in too small a scale for the firm. As we have already observed,
see supra note 5, substantial empirical evidence indicates that in recent years this incentive has, in fact, led
to a substantial reduction in the size of corporations in hazardous industries. Even in this case, however,
there will at the same time be overinvestment in the industry as a whole owing to cost externalization;
although individual firms will be inefficiently small, there will be too many of them.
On the other hand, in some cases the first scale effect could dominate the second, and hence lead to
too large a scale for the individual firm. This result is most likely to occur when the firm's activities give
rise to a small probability of damages far in excess of the firm's value and when, as the firm expands, the
probability that an accident will occur increases faster than the rate of production. Examples are likely to
be found among firms that run a low risk of a catastrophic mass tort, as in Bhopal. An Appendix available
from the authors contains a simple illustrative model.
If it is costless to divide up a firm's assets formally into an arbitrarily large number of separate
corporate subsidiaries, then limited liability will never result in too small a scale for the firm (when we
consider the "firm" as an economic unit under unified ownership and management without regard to the
number of formal corporate subunits into which it is divided). Rather, its only scale effect will be the second
one described here, which encourages firms to be inefficiently large.
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b. Exacerbating Factors: Debt and Dissolution
The perverse incentives just described are exacerbated if the shareholder
relies heavily on borrowed capital to finance the firm or if she can withdraw
her capital from the firm prior to the time when tort liability attaches.
Consider first what happens if, instead of fully capitalizing the firm with
equity, the shareholder directs the corporation to borrow capital either from
herself or from a third-party lender. Under the prevailing priority rule in
bankruptcy, tort claimants come after secured creditors in a distribution of the
firm's assets and share pro rata with its general creditors.10 Consequently, for
any given overall level of capital invested in the firm, a higher ratio of debt
to equity limits the firm's potential liability even further. This means that debt
financing accentuates the disincentive to invest in safety and the incentive to
overinvest in hazardous industries. It also implies that limited liability, together
with the prevailing priority rule, creates a bias in favor of debt financing."2
The second factor that can exacerbate inefficient incentives under limited
liability is the shareholder's option to liquidate the corporation and distribute
its assets before tort liability attaches. Since products and manufacturing
processes often create long-term hazards that become visible only after many
years, firms can-and often do-liquidate long before they can be sued by their
tort victims." State law generally holds shareholders liable for a corporation's
debts, including contingent tort liability, for a fixed period-commonly three
to five years-after the dissolution of the firm. 4 But many hazards may
remain hidden until long after the expiration of this period. When the going
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1986) (tort claims not included among priority claims in bankruptcy).
11. If, in contrast to the prevailing rule, tort claimants had priority over all voluntary creditors,
borrowing would not affect the incentives of the risk-neutral shareholder because lenders would demand
compensation for the possibility that their loans will be used to pay tort victims. Partly for this reason, as
we discuss at greater length below, see infra Part V.B, some scholars have advocated that tort victims be
given a higher priority in bankruptcy. On the other hand, under our proposed revocation of limited liability
in tort, it seems more appropriate that tort claimants in fact be given a lower priority in bankruptcy than
they now enjoy. See infra Part II.A.3.
12. That is, to avoid potential tort liability, a corporation has an incentive to adopt a debt/equity ratio
that involves inefficiently high agency costs and transaction costs. On the agency costs of debt, see, e.g.,
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 333-43 (1976).
We have been assuming here for simplicity that the shareholder is not wealth constrained-i.e., that
she has adequate capital of her own to provide 100% of the firm's equity at any desired scale of operation.
If she is wealth constrained, and consequently must borrow at least some of the firm's capital, the story
becomes more complicated. For example, if lenders are unable to monitor well the level of risk chosen by
the firm's shareholder/owner, then she will have even further incentive to take insufficient precautions, but
will bear part of the resulting increase in accident costs herself by having to pay an interest rate on the debt
sufficient to compensate the debtholders for the risk of losing part of their principal in case of a tort claim.
13. See Ringleb & Wiggins, supra note 5, at 578.
14. See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 278 (1990) (actions shall not abate if brought within three years after
dissolution); MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 14.07(c)(3) (1984) (revised) (liability for actions brought within
five years). Shareholders are liable pro rata for these debts up to the full amount of undistributed corporate
assets or the amount that shareholders have received in a liquidating distribution. E.g., MODEL BUSINESs
CORP. ACT (1984) (revised) §14.07(d)(2).
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concern value of the firm is large, the doctrine of successor liability may
prevent a shareholder from evading liability by liquidating the firm.15 When
the value of the firm can be recouped by selling its assets piecemeal, however,
the firm can be liquidated without shifting liability for long-run hazards to
either its purchasers or its shareholders. In this case, a shareholder need not
consider the possibility of long-run tort claims at all.
c. Limited Shareholder Assets
Under the simple assumptions made so far, a shift to unlimited liability
could entirely eliminate the inefficient incentives associated with limited
liability. If we drop the assumption that the firm's single shareholder has
sufficient personal assets to cover any potential tort judgment, however, the
situation becomes more complicated.
A shareholder who lacks sufficient personal assets to cover a potential tort
judgment can obviously escape the full costs of her firm's behavior, even under
a rule of unlimited liability, simply by entering personal bankruptcy. Or, put
somewhat differently, unlimited shareholder liability merely pushes back the
limits on liability to the point at which personal bankruptcy takes effect. Thus,
the shareholder in our hypothetical firm may still face incentives to misinvest
under an unlimited liability regime. On the other hand, these incentives will
be mitigated to the extent that she has any personal assets beyond her equity
investment in the firm. Consequently, the incentive argument for unlimited
liability remains strong.
Nevertheless, the opportunity to avoid liability by invoking personal bank-
ruptcy raises the possibility that a change to unlimited liability might induce
shareholders to undertake further evasion measures. For example, where the
shareholder is an individual, unlimited liability may lead to increased incentives
to rearrange property holdings in order to minimize the amount of personal
15. The reason is that a shareholder may have to sell the firm piecemeal to avoid imposing successor
liability on a purchaser of its assets. Under the pressure of product liability actions, many state courts have
expanded the doctrine of successor liability to follow a so-called "product line theory": A buyer that
continues the product line of a selling corporation assumes liability for the seller's torts arising out of the
product line. See R. GISON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1109-10 (1986); Roe,
Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1986). The precise formulae for
invoking successor liability are complex and vary considerably among the states. See Phillips, Product Line
Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 906, 906 n.1 (1983) (citing literature).
Nevertheless, the recent efforts to expand successor liability clearly attempt to limit the opportunities
to externalize tort costs offered by the limited liability rule. See R. GILSON, supra, at 1125-26. Among the
many advantages of unlimited liability is that it largely avoids the doctrinal morass and high degree of
uncertainty that now surround successor liability. With unlimited liability, the liability of a successor firm
for previously committed torts is reduced to a matter of contract: a successor firm assumes liability if and
only if the contract of sale provides for this; otherwise, or to the extent that the successor firm's assets are
insufficient to cover the liabilities that it has agreed to assume, the former shareholders of the selling firm
remain personally liable. See infra note 48.
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assets at stake in a bankruptcy proceeding. 16 In this case, unlimited liability
would impose the transaction costs of rearranging asset holdings and the
inefficiency of the resulting distorted pattern of wealth-holding. Alternatively,
where the corporation's shareholder is another, larger corporation, a shift to
unlimited liability could also create an incentive to sell the company to another
shareholder with few assets beyond her investment in the company itself. This
result would not only continue the incentives to misinvest engendered by
limited liability but might also lead to inefficiencies in management or to an
undesirable fragmentation of industrial ownership.
These and similar evasion strategies affect not just wholly-owned corpora-
tions but all actors subject to potential tort liability. Consequently, we shall
postpone their consideration until we have first addressed other aspects of an
unlimited liability regime.17 For the present, we simply observe that there is
no a priori reason to believe that the resulting costs would be serious enough
to outweigh the efficiency gains from adopting unlimited liability.
2. With Risk Aversion
We turn next to the somewhat more complicated case in which the corpora-
tion's single shareholder is risk averse.
a. Without Liability Insurance
If the shareholder does not have access to liability insurance, then the ineffi-
ciency generated by limited liability is potentially less severe where the share-
holder is risk averse than where she is risk neutral. With risk neutrality, damag-
es function only to deter harm, and for this purpose efficiency requires that the
risk-neutral shareholder bear the full cost of any tort damages. With risk
aversion, however, tort damages can serve two different efficiency functions:
they can create incentives for avoiding harms, and they can distribute risk
between injurer and victim so that the less risk-averse party bears most of the
risk. Choosing an efficient measure of damages commonly requires a trade-off
between these two functions.
When the shareholder is risk averse, both the deterrence and risk-sharing
functions will often be served best by making her bear less than the full loss.
16. One might think that, if abolishing limited liability in tort for corporations is a good policy, then
it also makes sense to abolish individual limited liability for torts by permitting tort claims to survive
personal bankruptcy (that is, by reforming personal bankruptcy so that it excuses individuals only from the
claims of contract creditors and not from tort creditors). There is, in fact, something to be said for this view.
Butpersonal bankruptcy serves the purpose, not served by corporate bankruptcy, of permitting an individual
a "fresh start" and hence improving her incentives for lifetime productivity. This latter purpose may be
sufficient to justify retention of personal bankruptcy not just for contract claims but for tort claims as well.
In any case, we shall assume here that personal bankruptcy will continue to give individuals the opportunity
to avoid large tort claims.
17. Part III infra.
1886 [Vol. 100: 1879
Unlimited Liability
Imposing full damages on a risk-averse injurer may lead to overdeterrence.'g
Similarly, efficient risk distribution19 may require that the victim bear some
or all of the loss. As a consequence, limited liability is less likely to lower the
private cost of tort damages for shareholders below the efficient level. Put
differently, limited liability places a constraint on the tort damages that can be
assessed against the shareholder, and this constraint is less likely to be binding,
from the standpoint of a lawmaker who tries to induce socially efficient behav-
ior while still respecting limited liability, when the shareholder is risk averse
than when she is risk neutral. On the other hand, this constraint often will be
binding even when the shareholder is risk averse. The result will then be a
lower level of precaution, and perhaps less risk-bearing by the shareholder, than
efficiency requires.20
It follows that, if full liability for damages were the only remedy under tort
law, situations would arise in which limited liability would be comparatively
efficient because unlimited liability would impose far too much risk upon the
shareholder. But in fact liability for the full amount of damages is not the only
possible remedy; more flexible damage rules are also possible. And, by combin-
ing unlimited liability with a flexible damage rule, a lawmaker can always
achieve a result that is at least as efficient as that which can be achieved under
limited liability. This last observation underlines two important points concern-
ing the relationship between corporate law and tort law that we shall return to
below in Part IV. First, the choice between limited liability and unlimited
liability interacts with the rule of tort liability that is applied. Second, limited
liability is a poor substitute for appropriate reform of tort doctrine.
To be sure, one could argue that limited liability is justified precisely
because it affords a means, however crude, of making the rule of tort liability
vary with the size of the corporation for any given class of torts. The sharehold-
ers of closely-held corporations are often not efficient risk-bearers and hence
should not have tort losses imposed on them in full. By contrast, large publicly-
traded corporations (which we shall discuss more extensively below) are
generally best treated as risk-neutral actors, and thus should ordinarily bear the
full costs of the torts they cause. Therefore, the argument might run, given a
uniform measure of damages for all types of corporations, a rule of limited
liability may be efficient because for any given class of torts, that rule is more
18. See S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 209 (1987).
19. That is, apportionment of unavoidable risks (or risks that are not worth avoiding) to those parties
who are least risk averse or best able to diversify the risks.
20. Shavell, supra note 7, defines as "the efficient level of care" the level of care x' that would be
efficient in a world of risk-neutral actors. He then shows, in effect, that the level of care taken by an
uninsured risk-averse shareholder under limited liability will commonly be less (and sometimes higher) than
x under either a negligence regime or a strict liability regime. But it does not necessarily follow from this
that the shareholder is acting inefficiently. In a world in which insurance is unavailable, the injurer is risk
averse, and the only tool of policy available is a liability rule, the socially efficient level of care may be
lower or higher than the level of care that is efficient under risk neutrality (that is, the level of care that
Shavell defines as x). Thus, the normative implications of Shavell's results are ambiguous.
18871991]
The Yale Law Journal
likely to limit recovery from closely-held corporations than from publicly-traded
corporations.
But this argument for limited liability is subject to at least three objections.
First, any such risk-sharing advantages of limited liability must be offset against
the incentives limited liability creates for opportunistically doing business
through small thinly capitalized corporations. Second, as we shall argue more
extensively in Part IV, it appears well within the competence of the courts to
adjust tort damages according to the nature of the corporate defendant, and this
approach is far superior to limited liability as a means of allocating risk be-
tween corporate shareholders and tort victims. Third, as discussed immediately
below, liability insurance is widely available for small businesses, and this
vitiates an argument for limited liability based on shareholder risk aver-
sion?.
Undoubtedly, some small corporations that are viable under limited liability
would cease to be so under unlimited liability, since they could not buy ade-
quate insurance and their shareholders would be unwilling to expose personal
assets to the risks of a tort judgment. But there is no reason to assume that such
small firms should exist-that is, that they have positive net social value. In
fact, an important advantage of unlimited liability is precisely that it would
force such firms-which are effectively being subsidized by their tort vic-
tims-out of business.
b. With Liability Insurance
When liability insurance is available, as it is for most businesses,23 the
argument for unlimited liability is further strengthened.
Consider first the simple case in which perfect insurance is available-that
is, insurance that has no loading costs (is actuarially fair) and gives rise to no
moral hazard (presumably because the insurer can monitor the insured's behav-
ior effectively). In this case, with unlimited liability, a shareholder having
personal assets sufficient to cover any tort judgment will have an incentive to
purchase full insurance. In turn, such insurance will give the shareholder
efficient incentives to internalize costs with respect to both level of care and
magnitude of investment.
21. Leebron might be understood to be making an argument of roughly this character. In any event,
he argues that risk-bearing justifies retention of limited liability for closely-held corporations but not for
publicly-traded corporations (for which he justifies limited liability on other grounds). D. Leebron, supra
note 1, at 52.
22. Moreover, where the insurance market is unwilling to assume a risk, there remains the option of
undertaking the activity instead through a larger publicly-traded corporation and having the stock market
bear the risk. Some diseconomies of scale might be incurred, but one might simply view this as the price
of more efficient risk-bearing.
23. Although there appears to have been a genuine crisis of availability in the insurance market of the
early 1980's, insurance became generally available again in the late 1980's-albeit at much higher premium
levels. See Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 176-77 (1991).
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With limited liability, on the other hand, the shareholder will often have
an incentive either to purchase no insurance or to purchase insurance that is
insufficient to cover the full range of losses that her corporation might cause.'
Liability insurance sold to businesses invariably has an upper limit on coverage,
and it appears that most firms choose a relatively low coverage limit, sug-
gesting that incomplete insurance is a common strategy.26 And, to the extent
that a corporation is underinsured, its shareholder will once again have incen-
tives to take insufficient care and to choose an inefficient scale for the firm.
In reality, of course, perfect insurance cannot be purchased. Loading costs
account for roughly one-quarter of all premiums, 27 and most liability insurance
undoubtedly involves a degree of moral hazard. If these market imperfections
were severe enough, many firms would not purchase full insurance even under
a regime of unlimited liability. Yet these imperfections may not be very serious
24. Consider, for example, the simple case in which the loss from an accident, and hence the amount
for which the firm will become liable, is fixed at some given amount L. Depending on the size of L, limited
liability creates an incentive for the firm either to purchase enough insurance to cover the full amount L
or else to purchase no insurance at all. In particular, if L is smaller than the value of the firm, or if it is
not too much larger than the value of the firm, the shareholder will buy full insurance. But, when L is large
enough, with limited liability the shareholder has an incentive to purchase no insurance at all. See Shaven,
supra note 7.
More generally, consider the case in which the magnitude of the loss L can be anywhere within a broad
range of values. The shareholder has an incentive to behave in one of three ways, depending on the
distribution of L: (a) if the smallest possible loss is large enough, have the corporation purchase no
insurance; (b) if the largest possible loss is small enough, have the corporation purchase insurance to cover
all possible losses; or (c) if the range of possible losses is sufficiently broad, have the corporation buy
insurance but with an upper limit on coverage that is less than the largest possible loss. See Huberman,
Mayers & Smith, Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules, 14 BELL J. ECON. 415 (1983).
25. For example, of the roughly 350,000 insurance policies that Aetna writes for the "standard mar-
ket"--which includes all business firms except the Fortune 500-one-third have coverage limits of about
$300,000 per accident, one-third have limits of about $500,000 per accident, and one-third have limits of
about $1 million. In addition, 10% of all firms carry additional "umbrella" coverage. Of the latter firms,
half carry $1 million in umbrella coverage per accident, one-quarter carry $2-3 million, and one-quar-
ter-about 2.5% of all firms insured--carry $5 million or more. Telephone interview with Frank Barry, Head
Underwriter for Standard Market, Aetna Insurance Company (Apr. 27, 1990).
26. It is estimated that, of the 350,000 policies Aetna writes for the standard market, only about 100
claims per year require Aetna to pay out the full policy coverage, including umbrella coverage. It has been
suggested to us that this number may be a substantial underestimate of the frequency of cases in which firms
cause tort damages that exceed both the firm's net assets and its insurance coverage. The reason for this
is that, where a firm's fungible assets are relatively small compared to its insurance coverage, the claimant
may be induced to settle for less than the full insurance coverage since the policy limit is effectively the
most that could be gained by going to trial. Id.
A simple example may help to illustrate this point. Suppose that a firm with $10 million in fungible
assets (that is, assets that could be effectively levied upon in bankruptcy) and $50 million in liability
insurance causes $150 million in damages. And suppose that the victim estimates that if he goes to trial
he has a two-thirds probability of getting a favorable tort judgment for the full damages and a one-third
probability that the court will hold that the firm has no tort liability. If the firm's insurance company offers
to settle the claim for $45 million-that is, $5 million less than the policy limit-the victim will find it
worthwhile to accept even if he is risk neutral, since his expected gain from going to trial is only $40 million
(that is, two-thirds times the sum of the defendant's insurance coverage and fungible assets). With unlimited
liability, on the other hand, the plaintiff would refuse to settle for less than $100 million, at least if the firm's
shareholders had sufficient assets to cover the full potential tort liability.
27. De Alessi, Why Corporations Insure, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 429,432 (1987) (loading costs were 27%
of annual premium fees paid in 1984 data).
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for most businesses. Loading costs are probably not disproportional to the
transaction costs of self-insurance or insolvency. That is, even without insur-
ance, the average firm would probably incur expected costs of similar magni-
tude in the form of lawyers' fees to defend tort actions and costs associated
with bankruptcy. In addition, writers of liability insurance for businesses claim
to be able to control moral hazard by inspecting their insureds and employing
experience ratings." These considerations, together with the fact that even
today, under limited liability, most businesses do purchase significant-albeit
not fully adequate-amounts of liability insurance, suggest that insurance
markets work reasonably well. Thus we have good reason to believe that a shift
to unlimited liability would be less likely to greatly increase risk-bearing by
shareholders of small corporations than to induce those shareholders to purchase
adequate insurance.
B. Corporations With Multiple Shareholders
For purposes of evaluating liability regimes, the closely-held corporation
with multiple shareholders resembles the single-shareholder corporation in most
respects. More particularly, there are no important differences between sole-
owner and jointly-held firms when all of the shareholders in the jointly-held
firm have identical assets, risk preferences, and information.29 If a firm's
shareholders differ among themselves in these respects, however, there may be
consequences for the costs and benefits of unlimited liability, and these conse-
quences may depend on the particular form of unlimited liability rule chosen.
1. Shareholder Differences and the Costs of Unlimited Liability
Even under a limited liability regime, heterogeneous shareholders face
different payouts in a jointly-held firm. Differences in risk aversion or in the
form of investment (for example, human capital versus financial capital)
inevitably lead shareholders to value a firm's potential projects differently.
An unlimited liability regime accentuates such differences in payouts. Dis-
parate risk preferences are more important because shareholders bear more risk
under unlimited liability. And, although differences in the form of investment
28. Telephone interview with Frank Barry, supra note 25.
29. Of course, even in these circumstances, multiple shareholders would respond to unlimited liability
differently than would a sole owner who capitalized an identical firm of the same size. The joint owners
might be less risk averse if potential tort losses were modest, since each would individually bear only a
portion of her firm's contingent losses-while the sole owner would bear her firm's entire loss. Conversely,
the joint owners might be more risk averse if potential tort losses were large, since in this case the sole
owner with limited personal assets might be able to externalize more of the losses. These effects, however,
are artifacts of the relative sizes of investments and asset pools; they do not result from the distinction
between sole-owner and jointly-held firms.
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might matter less under unlimited liability,30 this effect is overshadowed by
the importance of disparities in personal wealth. In the absence of insurance,
a catastrophic tort may cost shareholders their entire wealth under unlimited
liability; under limited liability, their tort losses are limited to their investments
in the firm. Consequently, under unlimited liability, shareholders with substan-
tial personal assets may be more conservative than their less wealthy fellow
shareholders in evaluating an investment that brings a risk of very large tort
damages. Conversely, however, very wealthy shareholders may be less risk
averse than fellow shareholders with more modest personal assets in evaluating
projects that bring a substantial risk of a relatively small tort loss-a loss that
would be enough to bankrupt the less wealthy shareholders but not the more
prosperous ones.
31
Yet the mere fact that the valuations of heterogeneous shareholders diverge
more sharply under unlimited liability than under limited liability does not
imply, by itself, that unlimited liability is more burdensome for the jointly-held
firm than for the single-owner firm. If multiple shareholders could bargain and
monitor risk costlessly, they could easily adjust the firm's investments and
distributions in a manner that accords efficiently with their disparate stakes and
preferences. For example, shareholders whose personal assets were unusually
large might be given a larger share of current earnings to compensate them for
the larger tort exposure they bear. 2 Similarly, the level of risk to be incurred
by the firm might be made the subject of explicit agreement among the share-
holders, with those whose preferences are far from the level chosen receiving
some form of additional payment in compensation.
In order to make and enforce such agreements, however, the shareholders
will generally have to expend resources on negotiating with each other and on
monitoring not only the risks incurred by the firm but also each other's assets.
It is in imposing these costs on the firm-or in deterring the formation of an
otherwise efficient firm because these costs are too high-that unlimited
liability burdens the jointly-held firm more than it does the firm with a single
shareholder. This raises the question of whether these additional costs that
unlimited liability imposes on the heterogeneous shareholders of a jointly-held
30. For example, a shareholder who contributed only human capital to the firm would find her personal
financial wealth at risk under unlimited liability but not under limited liability. Thus, her incentives under
unlimited liability would differ less than they would under limited liability from those of her fellow
shareholders who have contributed only financial capital to the corporation.
31. We are intentionally vague here about the particular form of the cost-sharing rule that would be
imposed on shareholders under unlimited liability, since the general arguments offered here apply regardless
of the rule chosen. In the following section, we discuss the choice of a specific rule.
32. In effect, wealthy shareholders insure the firm under these circumstances. They might be compensat-
ed for this service by a simple premium or, more likely, by a senior security with generous returns that
include an implicit insurance premium.
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firm are a sufficient basis for preferring limited liability over unlimited liability,
at least for a jointly-held firm.33
We believe they are not for several reasons. First, insurance is an obvious
solution for the negotiating and governance problems of multiple shareholders,
as it is for many other problems that might otherwise be associated with un-
limited liability. Most small firms already purchase liability insurance, and they
would presumably purchase more under unlimited liability to cover foreseeable
tort losses.' But the additional premiums charged for this expanded coverage
would, as a matter of course, effectively be shared among the firm's sharehold-
ers pro rata, according to the amount they had invested, thus mitigating prob-
lems of heterogeneous impact. Second, even when insurance is unavailable, the
absolute costs of drafting and enforcing a suitable bargain among a handful of
shareholders may not be large. After all, general partners routinely solve an
even more difficult problem by entering into partnership agreements that,
explicitly or implicitly, either reflect or ignore heterogeneous valuations of
personal liability, not only for torts but for contract debts as well. Finally, if
a promoter can neither purchase insurance nor recruit investors without it, the
proposed venture may very well not be socially efficient in the first instance.
2. The Choice of an Unlimited Liability Rule
Even if differences among multiple shareholders do not make out a case
for limited liability, however, they do raise a question about the best way to
apply unlimited liability to the closely-held firm. Two rules of unlimited
liability are possible. The first is a rule of joint and several liability, under
which each shareholder is personally liable for the full amount of a tort judg-
ment to the extent that it exceeds the value of the firm's assets. The second is
a rule of pro rata liability, under which each shareholder is personally liable
for a tort judgment in proportion to her equity ownership of the firm. To see
how these rules differ, suppose that a wealthy investor holds five percent of
a hotel company, while two impecunious hoteliers hold the remaining ninety-
33. It would be possible to make unlimited liability the rule for firms with a single shareholder-most
notably, wholly-owned corporate subsidiaries-while leaving limited liability as the rule for corporations
with multiple shareholders. As we note in our discussion of veil-piercing, infra Part VI, however, such an
approach would create obvious difficulties. For example, it would encourage corporations to sell to the
public a minority-say five percent-of the shares in its otherwise wholly-owned subsidiaries in an
opportunistic effort to avoid unlimited liability.
34. Of course, multiple shareholders might also have divergent preferences about how much insurance
to buy, thus displacing the bargaining problem onto the firm's insurance decision. Supplementary insurance
for individual shareholders, which we discuss at greater length below, infra Part II.A.2, would help resolve
this problem. And, even if such individual coverage remains unavailable, bargaining over insurance for the
firm is unlikely to pose a significant problem. In most cases, it is in the interests of all shareholders to buy
insurance adequate to cover most or all of the firm's foreseeable tort losses. Indeed, one reason to purchase
additional insurance on the margin is precisely to guarantee that all shareholders have homogeneous
preferences with respect to risk taking, and hence reduce the costs of collective decisionmaking.
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five percent. 5 If a fire causes tort damages that exceed the company's assets
by $200 million, the wealthy investor is potentially liable for $200 million
under the joint and several rule but only $10 million under the pro rata rule.
36
The choice between the joint and several and pro rata rules resurrects, in
a new form, the tradeoff between perverse incentives and transaction costs that
underlies the choice between unlimited and limited liability. The joint and
several rule is the prevailing rule in partnership law and in those exceptional
circumstances in corporate law where the corporate veil is pierced and share-
holders are held personally liable for corporate debts.37 Moreover, as compared
to the pro rata rule, the joint and several rule has the advantage of deterring
judgment-proof shareholders from externalizing tort costs. 38 In effect, the joint
and several rule conscripts wealthy shareholders to police the firm's insurance
coverage or, alternatively, to monitor the assets of its other shareholders and
the riskiness of its operations.39
The price of deterring risk-shifting under the joint and several rule, howev-
er, is to increase further the transaction costs imposed by unlimited liability on
a jointly-held firm. When insurance is unavailable, the joint and several rule
forces the firm's full tort losses on its wealthy shareholders and thus exacer-
bates the problem of asymmetrical stakes among investors.
Comparing the additional transaction costs imposed by the joint and several
rule with the costs of externalizing tort losses under the pro rata rule is difficult.
Indeed, it is conceivable that neither genre of costs is very important: on the
one hand, transaction costs among a handful of shareholders may be so low that
35. This hypothetical is not entirely fictitious. See Coyle, 2,337 Plaintiffs, $1.8 Billion, NAT'L LJ.,
Jan. 16, 1989, at I (litigation following San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel fire).
36. Since contribution on a pro rata basis is generally available under the joint and several rule, the
joint and several and pro rata rules converge when all shareholders can pay their pro rata portions of the
firm's tort damages. In this situation, the chief difference between the rules is that the pro rata rule assigns
the full costs of collection to the plaintiff, while the joint and several rule assigns the bulk of these costs
to the wealthiest defendant shareholder. Yet, because the joint and several rule also assigns the risk of failing
to collect to the wealthiest defendant, the two rules produce dramatically different results when, as in the
hypothetical in the text, some shareholders are judgment proof. For discussion of the differing impact of
these rules in tort law, see Rosenberg, Joint and Several Liability for Toxic Torts, 15 J. HAZARDOUs
MATERIALS 219 (1987).
37. By contrast, corporate law presently follows a variation of the pro rata rule in fixing the liability
of shareholders for claims arising immediately after the dissolution of the corporation. See supra note 14.
38. Under the pro rata rule, a wealthy and an impecunious shareholder might together undertake a
project with negative social value: although the wealthy shareholder would face liability for a fraction of
any tort losses, the two shareholders together could still share the expected gains from avoiding the
impecunious shareholder's share of any liability. As an illustration, the wealthy shareholder might receive
50% of the firm's equity after contributing 40% of its capital. In this case, 10% of the equity awarded to
the wealthy shareholder would presumably reflect both (1) her service in assuming half of the firm's excess
tort costs and (2) her portion of the gain that results from externalizing the other half of these costs. By
contrast, the joint and several rule would make the wealthy shareholder liable for the firm's entire losses,
and thus preclude any venture between the two shareholders that did not have a positive social value from
the outset.
39. Cf. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857,
871 (1984) (suggesting imposing personal liability on managers to induce monitoring of insurance levels
and risk).
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even hard bargains are easy to strike; on the other hand, even impecunious
shareholders may fear bankruptcy so much that they are unwilling to gamble
on risky investments. Thus, if the universe included only closely-held firms,
we would be hard pressed to choose between the joint and several and the pro
rata rules. Nevertheless, a different reason justifies preferring the pro rata rule
over the joint and several rule: as we demonstrate below, the pro rata rule is
clearly the superior alternative for publicly-held corporations. The advantage
of promulgating a single rule for all corporations makes the case for the pro
rata rule compelling for closely-held firms as well.
Of course, shareholders might attempt to transform the pro rata rule into
a de facto limited liability rule-for example, by disguising some of the equity
contribution of a wealthy investor as debt. Although evasive measures of this
sort might be more difficult to detect under the pro rata rule than under a joint
and several rule, we are confident that the courts could check the most egre-




Limited liability gives the managers of publicly-traded corporations an
incentive to assume too much risk, just as it does the shareholders of closely-
held firms. However, the public corporation adds several novel elements to the
comparison of liability regimes. In addition to a new class of hired managers,
these include: (1) large numbers of passive shareholders; (2) a market for
freely-trading stock; (3) substantial assets; and (4) potential tort liability that
may not only exceed the firm's assets but that may not be fully insurable at
any premium. The traditional view is that these elements-and especially the
need to maintain an efficient market for shares-make unlimited liability even
less appropriate for public firms than for closely-held firms. The merits of this
view turn principally on three issues. The first is the feasibility of administering
40. A similar problem arises in tax law, where shareholders in closely-held firms have an incentive
to characterize a substantial fraction of their investment in the firm as debt, rather than equity, in order to
avoid the corporate level tax that is levied on earnings paid out as dividends but not on earnings paid out
as interest. The courts willingly treat debt as equity for tax purposes when it is conspicuously used for tax
avoidance in this fashion. See B. BrrTKER & L EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.04 (4th ed. 1979). A similar-indeed, much the same-jurisprudence could well
be developed for purposes of imposing shareholder liability for corporate torts. Or it might be not only easier
but more sensible, for purposes of the pro rata tort liability rule proposed here, simply to treat as equity
all debt in a closely-held corporation that is held by the corporation's shareholders.
This is not to deny that, so long as no effort is made to mislead contract creditors, there are good
reasons for respecting the characterization of a portion of a shareholder's investment as debt rather than
equity for purposes of contractual liability. Owners of the firm should be free to make contractual
arrangements to share the risks of enterprise with other creditors in any way that they and those creditors
wish. Thus, there can be perfectly legitimate reasons for a shareholder to hold debt in her own firm, and
it should not be assumed that all such arrangements are mere shams undertaken for the purpose of evading
liability or taxes. (The bankruptcy doctrine of equitable subordination, which subordinates a shareholder's
debt to that of outside creditors when there is evidence of misrepresentation, implicitly recognizes this.)
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unlimited liability when shareholders are numerous and trade frequently. The
second is the potential burden that unlimited liability might impose on the
securities market. And the third is whether unlimited liability imposed on public
shareholders can improve the incentives of the managers who actually deter-
mine firm policy.
A. Designing an Unlimited Liability Rule
The threshold issue is whether unlimited liability is feasible for public
corporations. Several commentators have questioned whether any unlimited
liability regime can obtain meaningful recovery from widely dispersed share-
holders without sacrificing the liquidity of the securities market.41 We believe
that such a regime is clearly feasible: a well crafted rule of unlimited liability
would neither impair the marketability of securities nor impose excessive
collection costs.
It might be argued that, even if feasible, unlimited liability in tort for
publicly-traded corporations is unnecessary, since relatively few publicly-traded
firms have been bankrupted by tort liability.42 There are, however, important
reasons for extending an unlimited liability regime to publicly-traded firms.
First, the paucity of tort judgments bankrupting such firms may underrepresent
the frequency with which publicly-traded firms cause tort damages exceeding
their net worth, since tort victims suing under a regime of limited liability have
a strong incentive to accept a settlement for less than the full value of the
firm.43 Further, as suggested in the Introduction, the threat of tort liability
exceeding the net assets of such firms is likely to increase in the future. Finally,
and most importantly, any effort to extend unlimited liability to closely-held
firms without including publicly-traded firms as well would invite corporations
that are currently closely-held to avoid unlimited liability simply by selling
some portion of their stock to the public."
41. See, e.g., D. Leebron, supra note 1, at 26-8, 38-9; Woodward, supra note 2, at 604-6.
42. Since 1982, however, asbestos liability-admittedly the most catastrophic genre of tort liability
thus far encountered-has led to the bankruptcy of eleven major asbestos companies. Judicial Conference
of the United States, Report of Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 51 & n.33
(Mar. 1991) (unpublished mimeo) (on file with authors).
In the case of Johns-Mansvile, a trust fund endowed with $1.7 billion, the bulk of the firm's value,
was created during reorganization to settle asbestos claims without the need for additional litigation. As of
this writing, the trust fund has depleted its endowment after settling only 25,000 out of more than 140,000
claims. The remaining claims, now in litigation, have an estimated value of $6 billion. Id. at 25.
43. For example, if a corporation with net assets of $3 billion causes an accident resulting in damages
of $10 billion, the victims may accept a settlement offer of $2.5 billion, and save the company from
bankruptcy, since $3 billion is the most that could be recovered in any event under limited liability and since
settlement would avoid the costs and delay of going to trial as well as the possibility that the suit might
fail. Cf. supra note 26 (tort victim incentives to settle below insurance coverage limits).
44. This problem is discussed more extensively, infra Part VI, in connection with proposed veil-piercing
reforms.
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1. When Should Liability Attach to Shareholders?
An administrable rule of unlimited liability for the public firm must specify
both a measure of shareholder liability and the point at which freely-trading
stock imposes personal liability on its holders. For reasons that we have already
outlined in discussing closely-held corporations, and that will become more
apparent below, the most plausible measure of shareholder liability is a rule of
pro rata liability for any excess tort damages that the firm's estate fails to
satisfy. The more difficult problem is selecting the timing rule that determines
which shareholders become liable after a tort occurs.45
The choice of a timing rule in determining when excess liability attaches
to shareholders inevitably involves a conflict between administrative complexity
and opportunities for evasion. An "occurrence" rule, under which liability
attaches to persons who are shareholders at the time a tort occurs, is the most
difficult rule for shareholders to evade but also the most difficult to administer.
A "judgment" rule that attaches residual liability only to those persons who are
shareholders at the time of judgment is the simplest to administer but creates
widespread opportunities for evasion. A variety of considerations suggest that
a reasonable compromise is a modified version of a "claims-made" rule, which
attaches liability to persons who are shareholders when-or somewhat be-
fore-the tort claim is filed.46 We style this modified claims-made rule an
"information-based" rule.
The case for an information-based rule rests in part on the drawbacks of
an occurrence rule. The most obvious of these drawbacks is the difficulty of
determining precisely when a corporate tort has happened. Indeed, many toxic
torts lack an occurrence date even in theory because, as in the asbestos cases,
harm occurs gradually over a ten- or twenty-year period. The task of apportion-
ing excess liability among all investors who held shares in an affected company
at any time during this period would be an administrative nightmare. In addi-
tion, shareholders could never escape the risk of liability, since any beneficial
ownership of shares, no matter how brief, would impose permanent responsibili-
ty for undiscovered wrongdoing.
At first glance, a simple claims-made rule might seem to answer the draw-
backs of an occurrence rule. A claims-made rule would permit shareholders to
45. Additional issues involving assignment of liability would also need to be sorted out. For example,
there would be a question as to whether liability associated with stocks held in street name would attach
to the beneficial owner of the stock or to the broker in whose name the stock is held.
Liability evasion strategies involving shifts in formal ownership of securities are discussed, infra Part
I.A.
46. The range of possible rules is much broader. Liability might attach at any point from the occurrence
of the injury to the onset of collection efforts against shareholders. Thus, other alternatives include liability
that attaches when judgment is entered against the corporation, when the firm enters bankruptcy, or when
excess liability against shareholders is assessed at the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. As we
indicate below, we reject a rule that would impose liability late in the legal proceedings because it would
afford shareholders too great an opportunity to evade liability.
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escape liability for undiscovered torts merely by selling their shares. Under a
claims-made rule, moreover, shareholders who did incur a risk of personal
liability by virtue of a tort filing would usually receive clear notice of that
contingent liability even though any actual judgment against these shareholders
would follow only much later, after an unfavorable resolution of the tort action
and a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. For the same reason, the administra-
tive task of apportioning liability among shareholders would also be greatly
simplified under a claims-made rule.
Nevertheless, a simple claims-made rule would not be satisfactory in every
case. Where claims accumulate gradually, as they did in the asbestos cases, a
simple claims-made rule might invite massive selling at the time the first claims
are filed.47 Indeed, even when a catastrophic tort occurs in a single and well-
publicized moment, as with the Bhopal disaster, shareholders might succeed
in exploiting the interval between this moment and the time when the first
claims are filed to dispose of their shares opportunistically. In addition, a simple
claims-made rule might also leave residual uncertainty as to the liability of
particular shareholders when, for example, claims filed at different times were
later consolidated for trial. Applying a claims-made rule mechanically in these
cases would recreate the administrative complexity of an occurrence rule in
determining which claimants could ultimately collect against which sharehold-
ers.
For these reasons, we propose a modified form of the claims-made rule-an
"information-based rule"--under which liability would attach to shareholders
at the earliest of the following moments: (1) when the tort claims in question
were filed; (2) when the corporation's management first became aware that,
with high probability, such claims would be filed; or (3) when the corporation
dissolved without leaving a contractual successor.48 This information-based
rule would fix liability before shareholders could evade responsibility for tort
damages, without creating the uncertainties and complexities that would attend
an occurrence rule.
47. This problem of wholesale evasion of shareholder liability through the market has been analyzed
by Woodward, supra note 2, at 602. If personal liability for excess tort damages could be transferred by
sale of the shares until a relatively late date (for example, until the time of judgment or even bankruptcy),
then there would always be a strong incentive, once it became apparent that the expected value of tort claims
exceeded the firm's net worth, for shareholders to seek to create "homemade limited liability" by selling,
or simply giving, shares to insolvent or dispersed persons from whom collection would be difficult.
48. Even though corporate dissolution is a more likely prospect for closely-held firms and corporate
subsidiaries than it is for publicly-traded firms, the introduction of unlimited liability might increase the
incidence of early dissolution among publicly-traded firms in the absence of a device for holding exiting
shareholders liable. Holding the terminal class of shareholders liable, in both close and public corporations,
for post-liquidation claims would also permit a radical simplification of successor liability doctrine in tort
cases. Since shareholders would bear liability for hidden hazards, it would no longer be necessary to impose
successor liability to prevent the externalization of tort costs. See supra note 15 (function of successor
liability). Thus, purchasers of corporate assets could be spared the expense of monitoring for hidden hazards
and the risk of unwittingly incurring successor liability unless they voluntarily undertook to assume this
liability in, for example, a statutory merger.
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A "liability date," for purposes of the information-based rule, might be
established in either of two ways. First, corporate management could establish
it by making an announcement, perhaps accompanied by a court filing, stating
that a particular action or pattern of conduct was expected to give rise to tort
claims that might exceed the net value of the firm, and accepting responsibility
on behalf of all current shareholders for likely future claims arising from the
conduct in question.49 Management would have several incentives to make
such an announcement, including a desire to preserve an orderly market for the
company's stock,50 disclosure obligations under the securities acts,5" and
management's fiduciary obligations to its shareholders under state corporation
law.52 Second, if management failed to choose a date (or if it chose an inap-
propriately late date), a liability date could be judicially established on the
initiative of tort plaintiffs, either at a special hearing for this purpose after a
claim has been filed or, where many small claims are involved, at the time a
hearing is held to consolidate cases or to certify a class. In many cases, judicial
selection of a liability date would necessarily involve an element of arbitrari-
ness. This would not be a drawback, however, as long as the courts took care
to resolve ambiguity in favor of the earliest plausible date in order to deter
opportunistic share trading.
The information-based rule we propose would permit shares of an affected
company to resume trading unencumbered by outstanding personal liability
shortly after the first filings in a major tort action, or even earlier if manage-
ment announced a liability date. Thus, new investors and old shareholders could
49. To minimize litigation costs, shareholders might be required to waive any rights to contest the
liability date as a condition of owning shares.
50. As soon as it became known by the public that an event had occurred that might soon generate
claims that would bankrupt the firm, the market for the firm's shares would probably collapse (indeed, the
markets might call a formal halt to trading) until a liability date had been established clarifying that
subsequent purchasers of the stock were free of the residual liability.
For closely-held firms, the information-based rule would make it clear that manager/owners could not
evade excess liability by dumping their shares once they suspected that tort claims might bankrupt the firm.
In fact, it is arguable that such opportunism would be of no avail even under a simpler claims-made rule,
in which liability attached only upon the filing of a claim, since the owner/managers would be constrained
by existing prohibitions against insider trading and fraudulent conveyances. Cf. Roe, supra note 15, at 32-34
(reviewing fraudulent conveyance law).
51. To assure the fair and efficient functioning of the securities markets, there would be a good
argument for supporting the information-based rule at the federal level by adoption of a special rule, under
the securities acts, requiring management to make an announcement disclosing prospective excess tort
liability as soon as they become aware of it. Even absent such a special rule, presumably the corporation
and its managers would be prohibited from trading in the firm's shares without making such an announce-
ment.
52. Arguably management could cause substantial damage to its current shareholders by failing to make
an announcement, since, even without the announcement, the company's current shareholders would be
unlikely to escape liability by selling their.shares after management became aware of the potential liability
(because the courts would be likely to choose the date of that awareness as the liability date in any event),
and since making the announcement would be likely to raise the price that current shareholders would
receive for their stock. That is, management could generally cause current shareholders only harm and no
good by delaying the announcement, and hence could well be found in breach of their duty of care to the
shareholders.
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trade in a liquid market without reallocating liability for actual or anticipated
tort claims, which would remain firmly attached to the old shareholders who
had held stock as of the liability date. This is not to say, however, that old
shareholders would be unable to shift their contingent personal liability. We
would expect a specialized market in retroactive insurance to arise shortly after
the adoption of an unlimited liability regime. Such a market would permit old
shareholders to insure against the contingency that a tort judgment might
ultimately exceed the net value of the firm.
53
A final issue associated with administering any timing rule that fixes
shareholder liability prior to the bankruptcy of the firm is the conflict of interest
that might arise between old shareholders who bear contingent liability for past
torts and new shareholders who do not. For example, old shareholders might
suffer under any such rule if new shareholders, who purchased their shares free
of personal liability for already-filed claims, were to seize control of the firm
and, by dissipating its assets, increase the expected burden of any tort judgment
for old shareholders.- More subtly, old shareholders might also suffer if new
shareholders were to derail settlement negotiations with tort victims, since only
old shareholders would face the full costs of a liability judgment exceeding the
value of the corporation. It follows that any practicable regime of unlimited
liability must place a duty on management to avoid opportunism on the part
of new shareholders. An obvious way to discharge such a duty would be to
bond the assets available to satisfy a tort judgment-for example, by purchasing
retroactive liability insurance for the firm shortly after the establishment of a
liability date.55
2. The Costs of Collection
A second inquiry bearing on the feasibility of unlimited liability is whether
recovering from numerous public shareholders would be prohibitively costly
even in the absence of opportunistic efforts to disperse share ownership. Very
53. Retroactive liability insurance is presently an established, if relatively uncommon, form of insurance
that can cover either suspected losses that are not yet reported, or losses that are known but for which
payment is uncertain in timing and magnitude. Smith & Witt, An Economic Analysis ofRetroactive Liability
Insurance, 52 J. RISK & INS. 379, 380 (1985). Unlimited liability would create demand for such insurance
among shareholders who would like to shift their inchoate risk of liability during the lengthy legal
proceedings that might ultimately result in an assessment against shareholders. Shareholders who wished
to place a precise value on their liabilities might also purchase retroactive insurance. One reason to establish
a fixed liability date is to facilitate a market in such insurance.
54. See Woodward, supra note 2, at 606.
55. Of course, retroactive insurance would only be practical where expected liability costs at the outset
of legal proceedings were not themselves so large as to bankrupt the firm. The MGM hotel fire case provides
the best-known example of retroactive liability insurance. See Smith & Witt, supra note 53, at 396-99. If
management could not bond a tort judgment in advance, care would be required to assure that settlement
negotiations were conducted exclusively from the standpoint of old shareholders who retained holdings in
the company, since only these shareholders would bear the full costs of a failure to settle. Where new
investors outnumbered old shareholders, safeguarding the interests of old shareholders could conceivably
require the appointment of a special negotiating committee independent of management.
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large collection costs would make unlimited liability less attractive not only
because they would be wasteful, but also because they would lower settlement
values and hence reduce the deterrent effect of tort rules. We believe that
collection costs are unlikely to be prohibitive in this sense.5 6
One reason is that shareholders would rarely be forced into insolvency.
Equity holdings today are already highly concentrated in the hands of wealthy
institutions and individuals.57 Beyond this, assessments against shareholders
would seldom exceed the assets of even a modest investor. It seems unlikely
that even a catastrophic liability judgment would impose costs exceeding a
publicly-traded firm's value by more than, say, a multiple of five.58 Thus, an
unlucky small shareholder who had placed 5% of a $100,000 portfolio in the
stock of such a firm would stand to lose $25,000, or 25% of her portfolio's
value, in a worst case scenario. A large institution with 0.2% of its assets
invested in the same stock would lose 1% of its asset value. Although such
losses would be serious, they would hardly be beyond the pale of ordinary
market fluctuations.
Given that shareholders would be able to pay, the mechanics of collection
need not be excessively costly. A court could clearly administer the collection
effort: bankruptcy trustees already collect accounts receivable from hundreds
or thousands of debtors of bankrupt firms. Since share ownership on the
liability dates would presumably be the chief legal issue in most collection
efforts, few shareholders could successfully contest their assessments. 59
Wealthy individuals and institutions would have little to gain from litigating
separately to contest their assessments because they would be pursued in any
event. Moreover, even small shareholders might be induced to cooperate simply
by adding collection costs to the assessment bill of shareholders who unsuccess-
fully sought to contest their assessments.60
56. Leebron assumes that these costs would be extremely high, and apparently it is principally this
assumption that leads him to recommend retention of limited liability for publicly-traded firms. He asserts,
without further explanation, that
[tihe transaction costs of collecting the pro-rata shares would in almost every case be so high that
it would not be worth it. The rule [of unlimited liability distributed pro rata among shareholders]
would create additional uncertainty, but in view of the transaction costs the market would simply
heavily discount the likelihood that additional assessments would be made.
D. Leebron, supra note 1, at 39.
57. For example, the Columbia Institutional Investor Project estimates that institutional investors now
hold 45% of total U.S. equities and 48.1% of the equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations. C. Brancato,
The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets 19-20 (1990) (Columbia Law School mimeo)
(on file with authors) (paper presented at the Salomon Brothers Center and Rutgers Center's Conference
on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors).
58. See infra Part IVA concerning the principles likely to apply in determining the size of tort
judgments against corporations and their shareholders under unlimited liability.
59. It is, of course, difficult to predict in advance, and unwise to underestimate, the ingenuity of lawyers
in discovering means of contesting liability. We expect that some of the most troublesome collection
defenses would be jurisdictional ones, including disputes about choice of law issues. See infra Part IV.D.
60. Thus, the court might notify all shareholders of their liability assessments and of their potential
liability for collection costs if they refused to pay or choose to contest their assessments. Since share
ownership on the liability date would be the only matter at issue, few shareholders could successfully contest
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Another development that might be expected to reduce collection costs is
the probable response of the insurance markets to an unlimited liability regime.
In addition to offering retroactive liability insurance, as noted previously, in-
surers might offer portfolio insurance to individual shareholders to supplement
the liability insurance carried by public corporations directly. Most likely, such
coverage would be provided in standard packages for the small shareholder and,
therefore, would reflect actual portfolio risks only loosely. However, we see
no reason why unlimited coverage ought not be available to small shareholders
at a price that is not prohibitive. Although coverage without limit would be
unconventional by today's standards, demand might exist among small investors
who were risk averse or prone to misvalue the costs of low-probability catastro-
phes.61 In turn, insurers or even brokerage houses might be willing to supply
such coverage because, like life insurance sold to airline passengers, it would
be profitable. 62
Presumably the loading costs on portfolio insurance, were it available,
would be high. Consequently, large and diversified shareholders would probably
avoid it. Nevertheless, such insurance could greatly facilitate collection against
small shareholders by mitigating losses from insolvency and by centralizing the
collection effort against a handful of insurers rather than numerous shareholders.
In this case, the remaining constraint on collection would be claims against
uninsured shareholders that were too small to pursue vigorously.63 But the
collection effort would not need to reach every shareholder to serve its purpose.
So long as it could succeed against most shareholders, including the largest
shareholders, it would force public corporations to bear the bulk of their
expected liability costs.
3. Priorities in Bankruptcy
A related issue is the rule of priority for tort and contract creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings. Under the prevailing priority rule, tort creditors come
their assessments and, therefore, few shareholders would be likely to try, given the prospect of paying
collection costs if they failed.
61. Some authors report that people typically overestimate the probability of low-probability events.
See Zeckhauser & Viscusi, Risk Within Reason, ScI., 559, 560 (1990) (citing studies). In addition, other
work suggests that individuals will often pay a premium, in expected utility terms, for the total elimination
of risk. See, e.g., Viscusi, Magat & Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of
Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987). How far these results carry over to investment
behavior in the market is uncertain.
62. Although unconventional, insurance coverage without limit is not unprecedented. British motorists
are presently required to buy auto liability insurance without a cap, at least for pertsonal injuries. Letter from
Professor Gary Schwartz to Reinier Kraakman (May 15, 1991). Moreover, catastrophic tort judgments against
public corporations are rare events, and insurance companies would be protected against large losses by
insuring only the pro rata liability of small shareholders-a small fraction of the total excess liability of
an unlucky corporation.
63. A bankruptcy trustee might simply assign such claims to a private collection agency at the
prevailing market discount rate.
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behind secured contract creditors and participate pro rata with general contract
creditors. Under a regime of unlimited shareholder liability, however, there are
persuasive reasons to give all contract creditors priority over tort creditors as
a default option, while letting the firm and its contract creditors freely bargain
for a different set of priorities if they wish." Such a rule would provide strong
protection-stronger than under current law-for both contract creditors and
tort creditors. Upon bankruptcy, contract creditors would be able to collect
against all of the firm's assets under our proposed liability rule, without the risk
of being forced to share in the firm's value with tort claimants.65 But tort
creditors, in turn, would also be better off, since they could proceed against
shareholders when the firm's remaining assets were insufficient to satisfy their
claims. If, however, the firm's contract creditors were actually better placed to
bear tort risks than its shareholders-that is, were superior cost avoiders or in-
surers-the terms of lending to the firm could be adjusted to subordinate
contract claims, in whole or in part, to tort claims in return for a corresponding
premium on credit.
66
64. If the rule of priority proposed here were adopted now and applied not only to future contract
creditors but to existing ones as well, then it would provide a windfall gain to those existing creditors at
the expense of the firm's shareholders. Consequently, it would be sensible to apply the rule only to contract
credit extended after the date on which the new rule was adopted, leaving the priority of current contract
creditors unaffected.
Other problems of retroactivity posed by unlimited liability are discussed, infra Part IV.E.
65. For reasons we elaborate below, see infra Part IV.B, we believe that limited liability should remain
the background rule for contract creditors. Consequently, absent special agreements by the firm's sharehold-
ers to assume personal liability for contractual debts, the ability of contract creditors to collect will remain
limited by the assets of the firm.
66. To be sum, our proposed priority rule might also be reversed-that is, tort creditors might be placed
ahead of contract creditors as a default option-in the expectation that shareholders would then agree to
personal liability for unsatisfied contractual obligations when this would be efficient. But a background rule
that placed tort claimants first seems likely to be more costly than its opposite for two reasons. First, we
expect that shareholders are likely to be better than contract creditors at monitoring or insuring tort risks.
The firm's numerous small creditors will usually be ill-equipped to evaluate tort risks: although contract
creditors, when deciding on the terms of credit they will offer a firm, can judge fairly easily the amount
of a firm's assets net of other prior contract claims, they might have great difficulty evaluating likely tort
claims. Similarly, contract creditors will generally have difficulty influencing management's policies, and
they are unlikely to be better insurers than the firm's shareholders who, in large firms at least, can diversify
their holdings. (In this latter respect, moreover, we note that it seems important to choose as a background
priority rule the rule that would be best suited for publicly-traded corporations. It should generally be easier
for small closely-held firms than for large firms to recontract with their creditors to change priorities.)
Second, contracting around a priority rule that awarded tort claims first priority would be more costly
than opting out of a rule that placed contract creditors first. To permit opting out of a "tort-claims first"
rule at all, the management of a public corporation would have to exercise authority to impose personal
liability for contract debts on the firm's shareholders. Defining the scope of such authority could be difficult.
For example, would management only be given authority to make the firm's shareholders personally liable
for that portion of a firm's contractual debts that could not be satisfied because the firm's assets were used
to satisfy tort claims-in effect switching to the priority rule we suggest here-or would it be given the
broader authority to assume personal liability for all of the firm's contractual debts? Moreover, it is not clear
how one would provide notice to shareholders when the firm had assumed such liability on their behalf,
or how one would determine to which shareholders, or former shareholders, such excess liability applied.
By contrast, contracting to alter the "contract-claim-first" rule that we propose would be free of such
complications.
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B. Costs Imposed by Unlimited Liability on the Securities Market
Even more than the purported difficulties of designing an administrative
regime of unlimited liability for public corporations, the decisive objection to
unlimited liability, in the view of many commentators, has always been the
burden that unlimited liability might impose on the cost of equity for public
firms.' Thus the next step in comparing limited and unlimited liability is to
assess this burden.
There is no doubt that unlimited liability, as we have described it, would
increase the cost of equity. Indeed, the purpose of unlimited liability is to make
share prices reflect tort costs. Yet the literature suggests that, beyond internaliz-
ing tort losses, unlimited liability might generate additional costs by (1) impair-
ing the market's capacity to diversify risk and to value shares, (2) altering the
identities and investment strategies of shareholders, and (3) inducing market
participants to monitor excessively.68 The magnitude of these additional costs,
however, turns chiefly on the choice between a joint and several or a pro rata
liability rule. If shareholders faced joint and several personal liability for all
corporate debts, whether arising in contract or tort, these costs might be very
large. But, as Leebron persuasively argues, they should be much smaller if
shareholder liability is restricted to tort judgments and governed by a pro rata
rule.
69
1. Diversified Portfolios and Market Prices
The claim that unlimited liability might distort share prices or prevent
shareholders from diversifying risk70 is persuasive only under a joint and
several liability rule. Under a pro rata rule, shares would have the same expect-
ed value for all shareholders.7 ' Although individual stocks would be riskier
67. This burden has apparently proved decisive not only for commentators but for courts as well.
Professor Robert Thompson observes in his forthcoming empirical investigation of veil piercing cases: "The
willingness [of courts] to sometimes hold shareholders of closely-held corporations liable, but to never hold
shareholders in public corporations similarly liable, suggests that the positive role that limited liability plays
in permitting the public market for shares is strong enough to overcome any of the reasons used by the
courts to pierce." Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
(forthcoming 1991).
68. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 93-101; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra
note I, at 133-38.
69. D. Leebron, supra note 1, at 10-14. Virtually every commentator who addresses shareholder liability
points to the cost advantages of a pro rata rule. See, e.g., Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 1,
at 137; Manne, Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1967); Stone,
supra note 1, at 74; Woodward, supra note 2, at 604; Note, supra note I, at 1201. Leebron, however,
provides by far the most systematic discussion. Our analysis parallels Leebron's except that we accord even
less importance than he does to the costs of pro rata liability and are more sanguine about the prospects
for recovering tort losses from shareholders.
70. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 96-97.
71. To be sure, shares might have a marginally higher expected value for shareholders who would be
rendered insolvent by a large tort judgment. However, this effect would be minor. As was argued in Part
U.A.2, supra, even a catastrophic tort judgment against alarge public firm would reduce very few sharehold-
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under such a rule, the additional risk would be no more difficult to diversify
than the risk of tort liability is today. It would simply be larger in absolute
terms, which would increase the number of stocks in an optimally diversified
portfolio as well as the risk of taking a large position in a single firm. Given
that a pro rata rule would leave shares with the same expected value for all
investors and also permit full diversification of tort risks, it should not affect
the efficiency of market pricing. Risk-averse small investors with too little
capital to diversify fully under an unlimited liability regime could shift their
investments at very little cost to mutual funds or corporate debt. Moreover, the
infrequency of catastrophic torts suggests that a pro rata rule would impose
relatively small expected costs, even on undiversified investors, except when
corporate activities are extremely risky-which is precisely when an unlimited
liability regime is needed to prevent corporations from externalizing large costs.
It is sometimes argued that, regardless of how remote the probability of a
substantial judgment against them, the mere prospect of unlimited personal
liability would cause many individual stockholders to abandon the equity
markets entirely in favor of fixed-return securities, with the arguable conse-
quence of impairing the liquidity of the markets. But such behavior seems as
unlikely as it would be irrational. For example, under current law, every time
a person drives an automobile she exposes herself to unlimited tort liability.
Yet nearly all adults regularly drive automobiles, and casual empiricism sug-
gests that few individuals even feel it worthwhile to purchase liability insurance
that has exceptionally high coverage limits.72
2. Shareholder Investment Strategies
More subtle critics of unlimited liability have argued that its adoption might
adversely influence shareholder investment strategies on two other levels. First,
a defective collection mechanism that favored small shareholders over large
shareholders might discourage investment intermediaries such as mutual funds
and lead wealthy shareholders to abandon risky industries. 3 Second, unlimited
liability might encourage wealthy shareholders to "overdiversify" by eschewing
large stock positions, hence reducing the frequency of control transactions and
depriving all shareholders of the services of sophisticated monitors.
ers to insolvency. Moreover, since such shareholders would presumably bear unusual risk by holding the
shares in question, the higher expected value of the shares in their hands might not translate into a higher
risk-adjusted value.
72. Moreover, as pointed out by Leebron, supra note 1, at 7, most individuals regularly expose
themselves, in return for modest convenience or financial savings, to risks of severe injury or loss of life
which, by destroying or impairing their human capital, threaten much more severe losses of utility than
would result just from financial bankruptcy. This is true, for example, every time a person chooses to drive
a car rather than take a train, or to ride in a car without using a seat belt.
73. See, e.g., id. at 39 (threat to mutual funds).
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Under a pro rata rule, however, both of these concerns seem minor relative
to the beneficial incentive effects of unlimited liability. If collection from
dispersed shareholders is feasible, as we have argued, there would be little
reason for wealthy shareholders to prefer less risky firms or for small share-
holders to withdraw from mutual funds. If anything, investing in a broadly
diversified portfolio such as a mutual fund would become more attractive for
small shareholders.74 On the other hand, a pro rata rule clearly would increase
a risk-averse investor's cost of accumulating a large holding in a risky corpora-
tion relative to the investor's cost of holding a diversified portfolio. On this
dimension, unlimited liability poses a real question of the second best; at the
margin, control blocks in risky firms would become less attractive and takeover
premia would decline under unlimited liability, with a consequent decrease in
shareholder monitoring of the management of risky firms.75 This loss is argu-
ably a real social cost. Nevertheless, it would probably be a small loss in
comparison to the potential gains of inducing risky corporations to internalize
their full expected tort liability. The cost would be restricted to unusually risky
corporations and, even there, the magnitude of expected tort losses would
presumably pale in most cases next to the prospects for ordinary business gain
or loss associated with taking a control position in a public corporation.76
Finally, as we discuss below,' when determining the magnitude of tort dam-
ages to be assessed against a firm and its shareholders under unlimited liability,
courts might appropriately consider the greater risk aversion of controlling
shareholders with concentrated stock holdings and temper damage awards
accordingly.
74. Under unlimited liability, investing in a diversified financial intermediary, such as a mutual fund,
would protect investors from personal liability in fact but not in law. To deter wholesale evasion, an
unlimited liability regime must permit liability to pass through intermediary entities to the ultimate
beneficiaries of share ownership. Thus, participants in investment companies, no less than the shareholders
of parent corporations and holding companies, would themselves face pro rata liability if the intermediary's
assets failed to satisfy its assessment under the pro rata rule. In practice, however, institutional investors'
ability to diversify tort risk would assure that investors in mutual funds would barely notice the effect of
even a worst case liability judgment See text accompanying supra note 58. The pass-through rule would
have real bite only for thinly-capitalized parent corporations or holding companies.
For similar reasons, it would make little difference in practice whether or not liability were passed
through to beneficiaries (or settlors) of diversified pension funds. The simplest approach would be to provide
that liability will not pass through. To avoid an incentive for opportunistic use of employee stock ownership
plans, however, and to assure that firms that have adopted such plans for legitimate reasons face appropriate
incentives, there is an argument for passing liability through to their beneficiaries (or to the beneficiaries
of any such undiversified investment or savings plan).
75. The risk-bearing costs imposed by unlimited liablity on a control shareholder are partly offset by
the ability to influence management's policies toward risk. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note
I, at 136. To the extent that unlimited liability might lead control shareholders to accept less risk than
diversified shareholders would prefer, however, it would merely place tort risks on the same plane as other
business risks.
76. Further, any adverse effect of unlimited liability on the aggregation of control blocks and on the
acquisitions market might be remedied by facilitating control transactions in other ways, such as relaxing
the barriers to share accumulations created by state antitakeover statutes.
77. See infra Part N.A.
19051991]
The Yale Law Journal
3. Excessive Monitoring Costs
A final claim often made in defense of the status quo is that unlimited
liability would generate excessive monitoring of both management and share-
holders by all participants in public corporations. This claim would be plausible
if each shareholder were liable for all corporate debts as they would be under
a joint and several rule: in that case, the risks borne by each individual share-
holder or creditor would depend in part on fluctuations in the aggregate wealth
of all shareholders. All shareholders would then have a personal stake in
knowing about the personal assets of other shareholders who entered or exited
the firm.78 In contrast to shareholders in closely-held firms, moreover, share-
holders in public firms could not hope to reallocate payouts among themselves
to compensate for their disparate costs of risk-bearing.
Yet, this monitoring argument fails against a rule of pro rata liability for
tort losses. Under such a rule, a shareholder's risk would depend only on the
size of her own investment rather than on the wealth of other shareholders.
Furthermore, contract creditors would not rely on the wealth of shareholders
at all. Thus, the only effect of pro rata liability would be a marginal increase
in shareholder incentives to monitor the enterprise's expected tort losses. Al-
though this additional monitoring would not differ in kind from what sharehold-
ers already do, it would encourage managers to consider the full social costs
of investment decisions.79 Additional monitoring would cost more on the
margin, but it would be no more duplicative or socially wasteful than the
attention that shareholders already devote to all other matters affecting the value
of the firm. Indeed, tort risks might even be less costly to monitor than other
business risks. A developed industry of expert monitors-liability insur-
ers-already sells assessments of liability risk, with or without the benefit of
insurance. These same firms might easily collectivize the costs of evaluating
liability risks for the public market.
78. See, e.g., Carr & Mathewson, Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry, 96 J. POL. ECON. 766,769
(1988); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 95-96. In addition to assuming that unlimited liability must
involve ajoint and several liability rule, and thus impose substantial monitoring costs on shareholders, Carr
and Mathewson confine their analysis to situations in which the firm deals only with voluntary (i.e.,
contractual) creditors and does not impose damages on third party tort victims. (On the efficiency of limited
liability for contract creditors, see infra Part IV.B.) It is these factors that cause unlimited liability to be
inefficient in the model they present. Based on this prediction of inefficiency, they interpret instances in
which the law has historically imposed unlimited liability on firms in selected industries (in particular,
Scottish banking and U.S. law firms) as involving barriers to entry established to benefit existing firms that
either were able to obtain special exemption from unlimited liability or were inefficiently small. Gilson,
Unlimited Liability and Law Firm Organization: Tax Factors and the Direction of Causation, 99 J. POL
ECON. 420 (1991), throws some doubt on Carr and Mathewson's interpretation of the experience of U.S.
law firms.
79. Management's incentives are discussed more fully, infra Part II.C.
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C. Management's Incentives to Take Care
Given that unlimited liability is feasible for public firms, we must still ask
whether it can significantly improve their incentives to take care. In particular,
will the managers of publicly-traded firms be responsive to the incentives
created by unlimited liability? Unlike the shareholder-managers of closely-held
firms and the corporate parents of subsidiary firms, who make corporate policy
directly, the disparate shareholders of most public corporations seldom exercise
direct control over corporate policy. Why, then, should we expect the managers
of public corporations to respond to liability imposed on shareholders?
One answer is that a variety of market mechanisms press corporate manag-
ers to be responsive to shareholder welfare as this is reflected in share prices.
If shareholders faced full liability for potential tort losses, share prices would
incorporate available information about the full extent of these possible losses.
Managers, in turn, would then have as much incentive to consider the full
expected social costs of corporate torts as they now have to weigh all other
costs to the firm that shareholders presently bear as a matter of course. More-
over, shareholders who faced contingent liability would presumably demand
-and managers as well as outside analysts would presumably supply-far more
information about the riskiness of corporate policies, precisely because this
information would have greater importance in valuing shares. This additional
information, especially when it came from market sources outside the firm,
would further enhance management's incentive to consider the tort risks
associated with its policies.8"
Another answer is that even if corporate managers did not respond fully to
shareholder liability costs, imposing unlimited liability on shareholders would
still improve deterrence. If corporate managers undertake inefficiently risky
projects and do not pass the full costs through to shareholders, the return paid
80. Imagine, for example, that a corporation with $2 billion in net assets commits a tort that results
in damages of $3 billion. If the shareholders are to be excused from liability for the $1 billion in damages
that exceed the corporation's assets on the grounds that they have insufficient control over the corporation
to affect its behavior, by the same logic the shareholders should also be excused from having to bear the
first $2 billion in damages-which is to say that the corporation itself should not be liable for that first $2
billion in damages, since paying those damages (and hence bankrupting the company) will reduce the value
of the shareholders' stock from $2 billion to nothing. And, by the same logic, the corporation should also
be excused from liability for a tort that results in only $200 million in damages, since payment of such a
judgment will decrease the value of the shareholders' stock by an equal amount.
To be sure, if one believes that shareholders in publicly-traded firms have no control over the behavior
of the managers of those firms, and also believes that the managers of those firms are typically empire-
builders who want the firms to grow as fast as possible, then one might reasonably conclude that the
managers' (and hence the firms') behavior will be affected by the prospect of tort judgments less than or
equal to the firms' net assets, but that the prospect of excess liability judgments against the shareholders
will have no effect on managerial behavior beyond that which can be obtained simply with the threat of
bankruptcy. To subscribe to this view, however, is essentially to believe that publicly-traded business firms
would behave no differently if they were organized as nonprofit corporations. Although this is not a
completely indefensible position (for further discussion, see Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 41.L. ECON.
& ORG. 267, 283-84, 300-01 (1988)), we believe that the weight of evidence, and certainly of scholarly
opinion, is strongly against it.
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to shareholders will exceed the social return on investment in the industry and
too many risky firms will be formed. Put differently, unlimited liability will
prevent the formation of too many publicly-traded firms with uncontrollable
managers in risky industries.
Indeed, if limited liability for shareholders is justified on the grounds that
shareholders have insufficient control over corporate managers to have a
significant effect on the probability that the firm will commit a tort, it would
seem to follow that there should be no tort liability for publicly-traded corpora-
tions at all-a position that, we believe, would gain little support.
On the other hand, the problem may not be that managers will respond too
little to expected liability costs but, conversely, that they will respond too much.
As we have previously argued, shareholders can diversify tort risks under a
regime of unlimited pro rata liability and, therefore, will prefer that public firms
continue to invest as risk-neutral actors. Yet, even today, large public corpora-
tions insure heavily against tort liability under the existing limited liability
regime."1 Although there are other possible explanations, 2 such insurance
may be evidence of managerial risk aversion. Managers cannot diversify their
investment of firm-specific human capital in the corporation. Consequently, if
managers expect large, uninsured tort losses to threaten their jobs, they may
manage in a risk-averse manner in order to lower the probability of such losses
-and, in particular, of losses that might induce bankruptcy. Managers who are
risk averse in this fashion, it might be feared, would be overdeterred by unlimit-
ed liability.
It is, to be sure, theoretically possible that managers in hazardous industries
are already overdeterred by the risk of bankruptcy induced by tort losses, even
under the current regime of limited liability, so that a shift to unlimited liability
would simply accentuate this problem. Yet, as a practical matter, this seems
implausible. Many important classes of torts which create a risk of catastrophic
loss that might bankrupt the firm ten or twenty years in the future seem unlike-
ly to carry any weight in management's incentive calculus today beyond their
effect on share prices. Consequently, even if managerial risk aversion might
overdeter projects with volatile near-term payouts, it is unlikely to overdeter
distant harms that may remain undiscovered until well after management's
81. Existing liability insurance coverage falls well short of protecting all net assets of the types of large
public corporations in which managerial autonomy is most pronounced. Managers do not-and in today's
insurance market, cannot-insure against catastrophic liability that might bankrupt a $1 billion corporation.
Except in specialty markets, the maximum liability coverage that any corporation can purchase in today's
market lies between $400 and $500 million. Most Fortune 500 firms purchase less than $200 million in
liability coverage. Interview with Robert Hager, Director of National Account Underwriting, Aetna Insurance
Company (Apr. 27, 1990). Instead, managers of large corporations typically insure those firms against more
modest losses that, although well below the firms' net value, might nonetheless deplete their working capital
or seriously impair their earnings.
82. For an overview of hypotheses that are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, see Mayers
& Smith, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 1. Bus. 289 (1982); Mayers & Smith, On the
Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, 63 J. Bus. 19 (1990).
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tenure is over.83 Further, with respect to both near-term and long-term risks,
managerial decisionmaking is commonly shaped in important part by market-
based performance incentives that work to align management's interests with
those of shareholders. If necessary, the compensation incentives that offset
management's risk aversion today could be strengthened under an unlimited
liability regime. Even if such an adaptation of compensation terms were
necessary, it would not be large because unlimited liability would have its
primary incentive effect on shareholders rather than on managers. Unlimited
liability would increase the probability of tort-induced bankruptcy only indirect-
ly, by reducing the incentives for plaintiffs to accept a settlement for less than
the value of the firm's net assets even when provable damages are larger.'
Its more direct and stronger effect would be to increase the amount of losses
borne by shareholders when a bankruptcy occurs. For this reason, in fact, a shift
to unlimited liability would be more likely to reduce, rather than to increase,
the gap between the preferences of risk-averse management and risk-neutral
shareholders that performance incentives must bridge.
III. INCENTIVES TO EVADE LIABILITY
Thus far we have focused primarily on the costs that unlimited liability
might impose on existing shareholders and corporations, largely because these
costs are at the heart of the conventional defense of limited liability. Yet these
are not the only potential costs associated with unlimited liability. Probably
more serious, and more difficult to assess when comparing limited and unlimit-
ed liability, are the social costs that might arise from shareholders' increased
incentives to avoid liability under an unlimited liability regime.
In discussing single-shareholder firms, we noted that regardless of the rule
of shareholder liability, tort liability in general is always subject to evasion by
judgment-proof individuals. Whatever the rule for corporations, individuals
always have the advantage of the limits on personal liability available through
83. Under a limited liability regime, managers themselves would still enjoy limited liability of a sort.
Even if bankruptcy might threaten their jobs at some point, shareholder losses that exceed the firm's
bankruptcy point would not impose additional costs on them. Moreover, it is not even clear that bankruptcy
induced by large tortjudgments must necessarily threaten a manager's job. The fact that a firm is financially
bankrupt does not imply that it is not worth continuing as a going concern, or even that its current
management should be replaced. This is true even if bankruptcy not only costs the firm's current sharehold-
ers their equity investment in the firm but also imposes upon them substantial personal liability.
Of course, to the extent that managers are given, for other incentive reasons, an undiversified
investment in their company's stock, in addition to their investment in firm-specific human capital, those
managers will have an enhanced incentive to overinvest in safety under an unlimited liability regime.
Managers' investment in human capital, however, is generally said to be the chief source of managerial risk
aversion.
84. Absent a change in caretaking and/or insurance, a shift to unlimited liability would have no effect
on the probability of bankruptcy were it not for the incentive that limited liability gives plaintiffs to settle
for a judgment that does not bankrupt the firm even when their provable damages exceed the firm's assets.
See supra notes 26 and 43. Because of their latter incentive, claims that would be settled short of bankruptcy
under limited liability may lead the firm to bankruptcy under unlimited liability.
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individual bankruptcy. This option preserves strategies for evading tort liability
under a regime of unlimited shareholder liability just as it does under the
existing regime of limited liability. Unlimited liability would bar today's low-
cost strategies of evasion by self-incorporation or the partitioning of assets into
corporate subsidiaries. It would leave open, however, the three liability evasion
strategies that are presently available for unincorporated individuals or partner-
ships: (1) hiding personal assets or shifting shares; (2) shifting from equity to
debt financing; and (3) disaggregating industry. All three of these evasion
strategies operate by placing equity interests in the hands of judgment-proof
individuals. To assess their potential significance, we consider them separately.
A. Hiding Assets and Shifting Shares
As we have previously observed, unlimited liability would increase the in-
centives for individual shareholders to minimize holdings of personal assets
exposed to tort judgments. Tactics of this sort could rely on shifting assets by,
for example, passing title to other family members, spending more on present
consumption, or increasing the amount of wealth held in pension funds. Alter-
natively, such tactics could attempt to insulate assets by shifting share owner-
ship-for example, by donating all stock in a risky corporation to a trust for
the benefit of one's children. Tactics of either sort would blunt the ability of
unlimited liability to increase care-taking and could also lead to distorted
patterns of consumption and investment.
The potential importance of these problems is an empirical question that
is difficult to answer a priori. But there is reason to believe that they would not
be serious. They should have little effect on shareholders in publicly-traded
firms, who generally have too small a fraction of their assets invested in any
single firm to have an incentive to rearrange their personal finances in response
to the threat of excess tort liability. Rather, the problems would arise primarily
in the context of closely-held firms with only one or a few shareholders. And
even in those firms, two considerations would limit the extent to which share-
holders would shield their personal assets from liability. First, shareholders must
frequently assume personal liability for the corporation's contractual debts in
order to facilitate the firm's access to credit, and for this reason do not have
an incentive to minimize personal assets that are accessible to creditors. Such
assets would presumably also be available to tort creditors under an unlimited
liability regime. Since for most firms the risks associated with contractual
liability are likely to be more significant than the risks associated with tort
liability, the addition of shareholder liability for corporate torts should have
little effect on the disposition of shareholders' personal assets. Second, even
where unlimited liability in tort would otherwise create strong incentives for
shareholders to rearrange personal assets to shield them from liability, they can
succeed only within limits. The law already constrains the most opportunistic
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tactics of this sort, 5 and those constraints could be further tightened if neces-
sary.
86
B. Debt as an Evasion Strategy
As Easterbrook and Fischel remind us, not only shareholders but also debt-
holders enjoy limited liability under existing law. 7 Since there are persuasive
reasons not to extend mandatory unlimited liability to bona fide corporate
debt,88 heavy reliance on debt financing opens a second strategy for evading
tort judgments under a regime of unlimited liability. Although a wealthy share-
holder could not seek to protect her assets directly through debt financing, as
she can now do under limited liability,89 she might nonetheless attempt to
evade liability by selling the company to a low-asset shareholder who could
finance his acquisition with debt secured by the company's assets. Alternatively,
and perhaps more simply, a low-asset shareholder might raise debt financing
to capitalize a start-up venture in a risky line of business. These strategies
create a "high-roller problem"--a term we use to emphasize the central role
of the low-asset shareholders ("high rollers") who undertake to hold the risky
equity.' If transferring companies to high rollers were a common reaction to
the imposition of unlimited liability, it could have several unfortunate effects.
85. For example, most states place limits on the value of a personal residence that is exempt from
creditors. Also, efforts to shield assets from creditors after a tort has been committed, or perhaps even at
the point at which it becomes clear that the risks of causing tort damages are large, are likely to be frustrated
by fraudulent conveyance doctrine.
86. To take just one example, pension fund assets are currently shielded from tort judgments (and
criminal fines) levied on the beneficiary. This result is not mandated by statute, but rather has been devised
by the courts. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990); I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13) (1990); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)
(Supp. 1990). Yet it is a dubious policy to make an individual sacrifice only the assets he has accumulated
for present consumption, and not those he has accumulated for future consumption, when he commits a tort
resulting in substantial damages. If pension funds were to be used opportunistically to shield large amounts
of assets from tort liability under an unlimited liability regime, presumably this policy could be reversed
by statute or by judicial decision to make some or all pension assets available to satisfy tort claims.
87. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 90.
88. See infra Part IV.B.
89. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing debt as an aggravating factor under
limited liability).
90. There is evidence that oil refiners have begun turning to the high-roller strategy even under the
existing limited liability regime:
Already at least one international oil company has been parking the title to some of its oil
in transit with a willing outside party, a company controlled by fugitive oil trader Marc Rich in
Switzerland....
Many people familiar with the petroleum business expect "pass-the-cargo" schemes, such
as the one involving Mr. Rich, to proliferate.... In fact, Texas oilman and trader Kyle McAlister
says he's already canvasing U.S. refiners. For at least 20 cents a barrel, Mr. McAlister says, he
is prepared to run the liability risk for them, buying their oil and holding possession of it until
it reaches their refineries. To do that and keep his own assets out of reach of U.S. courts, he'd
pack up his wife and three children, liquidate his U.S. holdings and move to Switzerland.
Sullivan, Oil Firms, Shippers Seek to Circumvent Laws Setting No Liability Limit for Spills, Wall St. 3. July
26, 1990, at BI, col. 3.
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First, hazardous activities might still be undertaken with inadequate precautions
and insurance. Second, the high rollers who came to own, and thus to control,
small hazardous firms might not be the individuals who are most skilled in
managing them, thus resulting in losses of productive efficiency. Third, high
rollers would be constrained to maintain distorted and highly-leveraged capital
structures, which would impose further efficiency losses in the form of the
agency costs of risky debt. And fourth, since the capital markets would no
longer serve to diversify the risk of the hazardous activities in question, inves-
tors in those activities would bear much more risk than they do at present. The
first of these problems would presumably be substantially less severe than it
is under limited liability, since all the liability evasion strategies available under
unlimited liability are available under limited liability as well, while unlimited
liability frustrates a variety of low-cost evasion strategies that limited liability
facilitates, such as subincorporating or increasing leverage without otherwise
changing ownership of a firm's equity. But the other three problems would
presumably be much more pronounced under unlimited liability than under
limited liability, and one might worry that their costs would more than outweigh
any improvements in care-taking and insurance that unlimited liability would
induce.
There is good reason to believe that the high-roller problem would be
limited in most industries and, to the extent that it was not, could be mitigated
relatively easily with secondary legal controls. For the problem to be wide-
spread, there must be a large number of high rollers. These individuals must
share several characteristics: (1) they must be wealthy enough to provide, by
themselves or with a small number of others, sufficient equity to induce lenders
to finance a firm capable of undertaking a hazardous business of the type in
question-say, ownership and operation of a chemical plant; (2) they must not
be so wealthy, however, that they have substantial personal assets beyond those
that they invest in the firm (in particular, they must lack sufficient assets to be
able to come close to covering potential tort damages); (3) they must not be
very risk averse (that is, they must be willing to incur a substantial chance of
personal bankruptcy if tort damages should prove large); (4) they must have
sufficient skill and knowledge to assure that the firm they own is managed with
a reasonable degree of competence, either by themselves or by managers that
they select and oversee; and finally, (5) they must not find it excessively
distasteful to assume personal ownership of, and invest most of their assets in,
an enterprise that is intentionally structured to externalize tort risks by exploit-
ing their personal financial status.
The critical question is whether there are enough individuals with these
characteristics to take possession of any significant fraction of most industries,
or even of most unusually hazardous industries. We strongly doubt that there
are, particularly because many companies undertaking hazardous activities, such
as manufacturing of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, commonly require exten-
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sive investments in firm-specific capital-that is, in specialized plant and
equipment that cannot be redeployed elsewhere without a substantial loss in
value. Since such investments provide poor collateral, debt financing would be
costly or impossible to obtain, which means that a would-be high-rolling owner
would have to provide a substantial fraction of the necessary capital herself.
The potential supply of such very wealthy high rollers is likely to be particular-
ly limited.
To be sure, assets are readily deployable in some hazardous industries, and
the potential supply of high rollers might be broader in these industries. One
example is transport, such as shipping oil by tanker or toxic chemicals by truck;
hotels are another.9' Yet, precisely because these industries employ standard
assets, they are also easy targets for detailed safety regulation and in fact are
often heavily regulated even under the existing limited liability regime. 2 Thus,
the industries in which the high-roller problem is potentially most severe are
those in which it is easiest to find substitutes for tort law as a check on exces-
sive risk-taking.
Finally, under a regime of unlimited liability, courts would retain the option
of recharacterizing, as constructive equity, ostensible debt financing that served
as an obvious liability shield, thus making the debtholders as well as the
shareholders bear unlimited liability for corporate torts.93 To employ this tactic
often would create an awkward jurisprudence that might undermine the legiti-
mate uses of corporate debt. But truly opportunistic uses of debt financing to
avoid tort liability are likely to be highly conspicuous and easily isolated by
the courts. Moreover, the mere threat that debt could be recharacterized in
extreme cases might create sufficient legal risk to deter lenders from financing
most would-be high rollers.
C. Disaggregation of Industry as an Evasion Strategy
The preceding discussion has focused on the possibility of restructuring the
financing of individual firms by increasing leverage and passing equity owner-
ship to high rollers. A more serious variant of this problem would arise if, in
response to unlimited liability, large companies were to sell off their hazardous
activities piecemeal to small firms that were separately owned by different high
rollers. Thus, a large oil company, rather than continuing to ship its oil in
tankers that it owns and operates through subsidiary corporations, might sell
each of its tankers to a separate individual who would then contract with the
91. See supra note 35 (highly lethal fire in hotel that was intentionally thinly capitalized and uninsured).
92. Cf. Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357(1984) (discuss-
ing circumstances in which ex ante regulation of safety is likely to be efficient).
93. See, e.g., supra note 40 (discussing related recharacterizations of debt in tax law). A less drastic
tactic would be simply to employ the doctrine of equitable subordination to subordinate the debt to the
claims of tort victims.
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company to ship its oil. 4 Similarly, small firms with only one or a few high-
rolling shareholders might replace large drug companies in the development and
initial marketing of pharmaceuticals; these small firms would then sell a product
line to a large company for mass production and marketing only when it proved
safe. Such a disaggregation strategy might impose significant efficiency costs
through lost economies of scale or scope. These costs could arise, for example,
if a large oil company that sold its fleet of 100 tankers were a more efficient
manager of those ships than 100 individual high rollers could be.
Once again, however, there are several reasons to believe that evasion
through disaggregation would not constitute a serious threat. First, only a small
number of companies are likely to perceive profitable opportunities for ineffi-
cient disaggregation. As we have previously argued, the supply of high rollers
with just the right characteristics to own and operate, say, individual oil tankers
or pharmaceutical plants is likely to be limited. In addition, the demand for high
rollers is also likely to be limited. An incentive for disaggregation in any given
case would not arise under unlimited liability unless the resulting inefficiencies,
including lost economies of scale or quality of management, were smaller than
the private gains from avoiding potential tort liability. If they were not, a parent
firm would choose to retain ownership of the risky asset in question rather than
selling it. Thus, the range of cases in which the disaggregation strategy might
be worthwhile should be relatively narrow.
Beyond this, the costs of inefficient disaggregation might also be offset by
eliminating the inefficient incentives to integrate hazardous activities that persist
under the existing limited liability regime. Limited liability creates an incentive
for inefficiently high levels of corporate leverage because, under this regime,
a firm's equity need not be held by a high roller for the firm to employ debt
financing to evade tort liability. As noted above, an individually-owned firm
with substantial firm-specific assets will have difficulty obtaining debt fmanc-
ing. But if the same firm is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a larger corporation,
debt financing will be much easier to obtain. A corporate parent can lend funds
directly or, alternatively, it can either guarantee its subsidiary's debt to a third
party or (to minimize the prospects that the debt will be subordinated) simply
offer its reputation as a hostage for repayment of its subsidiary's debt. It is
therefore possible that, for example, some pharmaceutical companies now retain
subsidiaries solely to exploit debt financing as a device for externalizing tort
costs, and not because of any operational efficiencies. If this strategy in fact
currently contributes to integration in some industries, then any disaggregation
resulting from a shift to unlimited liability would, at least in part, simply offset
a contrary inefficiency.
Finally, even if unlimited liability might lead to some inefficient disaggrega-
tion, there are effective ways to limit disaggregation short of retaining limited
94. See supra notes 4 and 90.
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liability. As we have already suggested, the most opportunistic, and hence
costly, instances of disaggregation to avoid tort liability are likely to be obvious
and concentrated in particular industries. For example, it would be quite
conspicuous if, following the adoption of unlimited liability, ownership of large
numbers of oil tankers were transferred to individuals with modest assets who
financed their single-ship companies with substantial amounts of debt.9 And
in such cases it may well be possible to adopt measures that will make disag-
gregation unprofitable. We have already noted the potential for direct regulation
of safety in many such industries. Further, in the case of the oil tankers, for
instance, making companies that produce, own, or intend to receive the oil
jointly and severally liable for spills may well remove any incentive for ineffi-
cient disaggregation. Or perhaps an even more effective and administrable
measure would be to require all oil tankers operating in the jurisdiction's
territorial waters to carry substantial liability insurance against oil spills.9
D. Evaluating Evasion Strategies
Taken together, the three evasion strategies of hiding assets, debt financing,
and disaggregating industry clearly constitute a potentially serious problem for
a regime of unlimited liability. Each of these strategies would not only blunt
safety incentives under an unlimited liability regime but would also generate
other efficiency costs, ranging from the reallocation of individual assets to the
loss of integration gains. Yet the magnitude of these effects and the ease with
which they might be countered are empirical questions. As we have argued,
there is good reason to believe that they would not overshadow the efficiency
gains that unlimited shareholder liability would introduce, given the seeming
implausibility of a wholesale shift of assets into the hands of high rollers who
happen to have just the right assets, preferences, and access to credit necessary
95. We do not mean to suggest by this example that we are confident that oil tankers are most
efficiently owned and operated by large oil companies rather than by individuals. Conceivably, ownership
by small firms or individuals is generally more efficient, and large oil companies may often own such ships
simply as a result of managerial empire-building or in response to the incentives, described in the preceding
paragraph, that limited liability creates for inefficient integration. In that case, disaggregation induced by
unlimited liability may not decrease efficiency.
Although disaggregation might result in insufficient incentives for loss avoidance, the same problem
already exists under the current regime, which allows for opportunistic formation of thinly capitalized
corporate subsidiaries with limited liability.
96. We shall argue below, see infra Part VI.A, that mandatory insurance is not in general a workable
solution to the problems created by limited liability. But as a modest aid to unlimited liability, mandatory
insurance could be quite effective. It would not be necessary to establish with any particular accuracy the
appropriate amount of insurance for a ship to carry. Rather, it would suffice simply to require enough
insurance so that, when the cost of that insurance is combined with the operating inefficiencies of
disaggregated ownership, it does not pay to have individuals, rather than larger and better capitalized firms,
own the ships. That is, one would not rely on the insurance requirement to solve the externality problem
itself, but only to discourage inefficient disaggregation. Nor would it be necessary to impose such mandatory
insurance requirements on all industries; only those industries in which there are conspicuous and otherwise
uncontrollable incentives to disaggregate ownership inefficiently need such a requirement.
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to become repositories of risky equity. Recall, moreover, that the relevant
comparison in evaluating evasion strategies is not between limited liability
without evasion and unlimited liability with it. Large-scale evasion of tort
liability already occurs under limited liability,97 and at least one popular eva-
sion strategy to date-compartmentalizing a company's risky assets into
separate subsidiaries-would become much more difficult under unlimited
liability. Indeed, it is not even certain, as an empirical matter, that total evasion
costs would increase following a shift to unlimited liability. Only the nature
of the comparison is clear: evasion could well be more costly to the public in
the instances where it occurs under an unlimited liability regime, but successful
evasion might well occur much more frequently under the existing limited
liability regime because low-cost evasion strategies such as subsidiarization are
so readily available. 98
IV. SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY AS A PROBLEM OF TORT LAW
In the past, limited liability has generally been seen as a problem of corpo-
rate law. The efficiency of the capital markets, it was argued, would be serious-
ly damaged if shareholders were exposed to personal liability for corporate
torts. Consequently, the formal boundaries of the corporation that have been
established for purposes of contractual rights99 should also be respected in tort.
One of the principal points we wish to make is that this is not so. As we have
argued above, the capital markets, and in particular the stock market, would
continue to function efficiently with unlimited shareholder liability. Rather,
shareholder liability should be seen as a standard problem of tort law. Viewed
this way, the right question is simply: When are a corporation's shareholders
cheaper cost avoiders and/or cheaper insurers than the persons who may be
injured by the corporation's activities?
A. Appropriate Tort Rules for Shareholders
It is sometimes argued that, even if unlimited liability could be imposed on
corporate shareholders without seriously interfering with the capital markets,
the broad potential scope of enterprise liability under prevailing liability rules
and damage measures constitutes an independent reason for favoring limited
liability. For example, one might be concerned that unlimited liability would
thrust upon shareholders the risk of very large losses associated with very low-
97. See supra Introduction (evidence of widespread liability evasion today).
98. Although we shall not discuss limited partnerships in depth, we note that if unlimited liability in
tort is appropriate for corporate shareholders, then it is presumably also appropriate for limited partners and
should be extended to them as well. Indeed, adoption of unlimited liability in tort for corporations but not
for limited partnerships would in many cases simply encourage the continuing evasion of liability through
conversion of corporations into limited partnerships with low-asset general partners.
99. See infra the discussion of contract liability in Part IV.B.
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probability accidents-the type of losses that insurance will not cover and that
shareholders will find hard to assess, or to avoid by monitoring management.
More graphically, the concept of unlimited liability seems to engender in the
minds of many the image of small passive shareholders with modest means
being suddenly and unexpectedly thrown into personal bankruptcy when the
few shares of publicly-traded stock they own bring upon them massive personal
liability for some corporate tort. In the worst nightmare scenarios of this sort,
a well-managed corporation and its shareholders are held strictly liable for
billions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages for product-related
injuries that the firm could not possibly have foreseen, that were caused many
years ago, and that could better have been avoided by care-taking on the part
of consumers.
But such results need not follow from abolishing limited liability. With
unlimited liability, it will remain to the courts to determine which costs are
efficiently and equitably borne by a corporation and its shareholders and which
are not. Some costs associated with corporate activity should be left on victims
or their insurers rather than borne by corporations or, particularly, their share-
holders.1°0 But there is no reason to believe that this will always be the case,
as the prevailing limited liability regime necessarily presumes. Shareholders
who benefit, for example, from intentional dumping of toxic wastes, from
marketing hazardous products without warnings, or from exposing employees
without their knowledge and consent to working conditions known by the firm
to pose substantial health risks, should not be able to avoid the resulting costs
simply by limiting the capitalization of their firm.
In this respect, the courts should appropriately consider the structure of
particular corporate defendants in determining the extent of their tort liability
under an unlimited liability regime. For example, when the defendant corpora-
tion is the wholly-owned subsidiary of a large parent corporation, the prospect
that a judgment might exceed the corporation's net assets and thus spill over
onto its parent shareholder should generally not, in itself, affect the size of the
judgment. When the firm's shareholders are individuals, however, the prospect
of shareholder liability might sometimes be a reason to temper the amount of
the damages assessed. In some cases, the transaction costs occasioned by
individual shareholder liability may not justify whatever added deterrence or
insurance benefits come from assessing damages that exceed the firm's assets.
Moreover, among firms with individual shareholders, it may often be worth-
while to distinguish between small closely-held firms and publicly-held firms.
For example, corporate liability that is justified on the grounds of risk-bearing
(insurance) is more sensibly imposed on individual shareholders in publicly-held
firms than on shareholders in privately-held firms, since public shareholders
100. For example, as Schwartz has cogently argued, risks that are "remote" (in his parlance) should
often be left to lie where they fall. Schwartz, supra note 1.
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presumably have better-diversified investments. Similarly, smaller judgments
against closely-held firms will often be justified for purposes of deterrence,
since liability is likely to deter risk-averse shareholders with concentrated stock-
holdings more readily than diversified shareholders in public corporations.
Such discrimination among different types of firms and shareholders need
not require self-conscious development of a sophisticated jurisprudence or
elaborate instruction of juries. Indeed, distinctions of these types would proba-
bly be made by judges and juries in any event, simply on the basis of their
untutored sense of what is "fair."
To be sure, whether courts are capable of distinguishing among corporate
defendants is irrelevant if one believes that courts are inclined to create exces-
sively broad liability for corporate actors in general-for example, in the realm
of products liability t0 t-and that limited liability therefore serves to restrain
judicial overreaching. In this case, one might fear that unlimited liability would
simply lead courts to search for deeper pockets for compensating victims, and
thus encourage judges to be even more irresponsible than in the past in making
unjustifiably large damage awards.
Yet this argument is not compelling. There may be good reasons for
retreating somewhat from recent expansions of enterprise liability, although this
remains a debatable issue.1" But, even so, limited liability is an extremely
crude check on the courts; it restricts liability excessively in some cases and
not enough in others, and it motivates shareholders and corporations to behave
opportunistically. If the scope of enterprise liability needs to be narrowed, the
appropriate reform is not to invite firms to opt out of the tort system by
exploiting limited liability. Rather, one should craft liability rules and damage
measures that impose costs upon corporations and their shareholders only to
the extent that these actors appear to be the cheapest cost avoiders and/or
insurers. Indeed, there is already evidence that the courts have recently, on their
own, begun taking a more conservative approach to enterprise liability. 13
Moreover, precisely the opposite argument seems equally plausible: with
unlimited liability, courts would be forced to consider the appropriate scope of
enterprise liability more thoughtfully, in the full awareness that limited liability
would not automatically constrain any tendency toward excessive liability.
Courts could not award generous damages under the illusion that only corpora-
tions, and not individuals, would bear the resulting costs. Rather, they could
not escape the fact that tort liability large enough to bankrupt a publicly-held
101. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILrrY LAW (1980); Priest, Products Liability Law
and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988);
cf. Viscusi, supra note 23, at 176-77 (doctrinal change has led to product liability crisis).
102. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis: An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events
in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990).
103. See Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of
Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
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corporation would also impose direct costs upon thousands of individual share-
holders.
We do not want to exaggerate our faith in tort law as a means of controlling
behavior. It is a very rough and costly mechanism. But it usefully discourages
the most severe forms of opportunistic cost externalization. Moreover, if any
class of actors is likely to respond rationally to the deterrence incentives created
by tort law, it is corporations and their shareholders. Similarly, if tort law is
to have any role in shifting risks to low-cost insurers, then using it to shift risks
to the equity market makes sense. Consequently, allowing corporations to avoid
tort liability through the simple device of limited liability seems, at the very
least, highly suspect.
B. Limited Liability for Contract Creditors
The case against limited liability in tort does not extend to contract. There
are compelling reasons for retaining limited liability as the background rule for
contract creditors. Limited liability for contractual debts simply permits the
owners and creditors of a firm to allocate the risks of the enterprise between
themselves in whatever fashion is most efficient. In setting the firm's net
capitalization, the firm's owners determine how much risk they will bear. And,
by looking at the corporation's net assets, individuals who contract with the
firm can determine relatively easily just how much risk they will bear in
extending credit to the firm; they can then adjust their credit terms to compen-
sate for any risks that limited liability will impose on them.
If it were generally efficient for shareholders to pledge all of their assets
as security for credit extended to the firm, then limited liability would not be
a sensible background rule for corporate contracting. But this is not the case.
In small closely-held firms, the firm's creditors may often be more efficient
risk-bearers than the firm's individual owners. And in large firms, it may often
make sense to divide the firm into subunits for the sake of pledging assets as
security to contract creditors." This subdivision helps creditors assess the
riskiness of the underlying business and the amount of assets available to them
as security: they can confine their investigation to the particular subsidiary that
they already understand without analyzing the assets and potential liabilities of
the firm's other lines of business. Moreover, it is common practice for a
corporation's shareholders-whether individuals in the case of a closely-held
firm, or a parent corporation in the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary-to
waive limited liability toward contract creditors in cases where this is most
efficient (that is, where waiver will reduce the total cost of contracting). 105
Limited liability toward contract creditors therefore makes sense even for
104. See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976).
105. See, e.g., DEL GEN. CORP. L. §102(b)(6) (authorizing waiver of limited liability).
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corporations that have a single shareholder, whether that shareholder is an
individual or another corporation. 106
The shareholders of a corporation that falls into financial difficulty may,
of course, seek to drain the corporation's assets before contract creditors can
levy on them. But substantial creditors can contract for specific limitations on
a corporation's ability to undertake such distributions, and smaller creditors are
protected from the worst forms of such opportunism by veil-piercing doctrine,
fraudulent conveyance law, and the bankruptcy doctrine of equitable subordina-
tion. Moreover, a corporation's shareholders have a strong incentive to bond
themselves in ways that will prevent them from undertaking opportunistic
distributions, since such bonding will reduce the corporation's cost of credit.
Tort victims, unlike contract creditors, cannot assess the potential credit-
worthiness of a corporation before they are injured, much less insist on compen-
sation for bearing the risk that they will suffer harms that the corporation's
assets are insufficient to cover. Consequently, limited liability in tort permits
the firm's owners to determine unilaterally how much of their property will be
exposed to potential tort claims, thereby inviting opportunism and inefficiency.
In short, for involuntary creditors, tort law rather than contract law must
determine the appropriate allocation of costs among actors, and limited liability
prevents tort law from fulfilling this function.
Indeed, limited liability in tort may actually interfere with the legitimate
uses of limited liability in contract. For example, as just suggested, a large
corporation may have an incentive to subdivide its activities into a given
partitioning of wholly-owned corporate subsidiaries in order to pledge its assets
to contract creditors. But limited liability in tort may well provide an incentive
to subdivide the corporation into a very different set of subsidiaries that is less
efficient in reducing the costs of credit. In particular, the subdivision chosen
for purposes of externalizing tort liability is likely to involve a larger number
of subsidiaries and perhaps also a different partitioning of functions among
them, as the firm tries to segregate its riskiest activities into separate corpora-
tions.
C. Which Creditors Are Involuntary?
Because limited liability should be retained as the background rule for
contract creditors, it would be necessary, if unlimited liability were adopted for
tort claims, to distinguish clearly between claims against a corporation that arise
in tort and claims that arise in contract. The obvious difficulties lie in areas,
such as products liability and workplace injuries, where, although the victim
106. It is for this reason that it makes sense to permit the formation of a corporation with a single
shareholder, something that might otherwise seem pointless and that the law was in fact somewhat slow
in recognizing.
1920 [Vol. 100: 1879
Unlimited Liability
had a contractual relationship with the firm prior to the injury, the courts have
been inclined to classify the injury as a tort.
These difficulties do not, however, seem serious. The critical question is
whether the victim was able, prior to the injury, to assess the risks she took in
dealing with the firm and to decline to deal if those risks seemed excessive in
comparison with the net advantages she otherwise derived from the transaction.
In other words, the question is whether the victim can reasonably be understood
to have contracted with the firm in substantial awareness of the risks of injury
involved. 7 If so, then the liability should be considered contractual, and
limited liability should be considered a background term of the contract, to be
respected unless specifically waived. If not, the victim should be considered
an involuntary creditor and the corporation's shareholders should not be permit-
ted to invoke limited liability.
The courts must already draw the line between tort and contract in other
contexts, such as the enforceability of waivers of warranties. The criterion they
apply in making this distinction, it appears, is roughly that just described.
Consequently, for the purpose of determining when shareholders are subject
to unlimited liability, it seems appropriate to follow existing judge-made
doctrine as to what is a tort, and in general to rely on the courts to continue
to draw the line between tort and contract in the future. There should be no
need to develop an extensive new jurisprudence for this purpose.
D. Conflict of Laws
State corporation statutes are commonly silent, or at least ambiguous, as
to whether shareholders have limited liability for corporate torts.108 This is
appropriate since, as we have argued, shareholder liability for corporate torts
should be viewed as a question of tort law rather than corporate law. In general,
the rules of tort law applied to a given accident should be those of the jurisdic-
tion in which the tort occurred rather than the jurisdiction in which the defen-
dant firm was incorporated. The contrary choice of law rule would give rise
to an adverse selection problem (a "race to the bottom") in which states would
have an incentive to adopt inefficient corporation statutes that limit the tort
liability of shareholders as much as possible and hence benefit shareholders
107. Of course, this question should not generally be asked of each individual victim, but rather for
categories of victims.
108. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(b)(6) (providing only that shareholders shall not be personally
liable for a corporation's "debts"). The Revised Model Act has an unfortunate provision stating that a
shareholder is "not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct," MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT §6.22 (1984) (revised)
(emphasis added), which might be read as an effort to immunize shareholders from personal liability for
a corporation's torts as well as for its contractual debts.
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(and the state, through the corporation franchise fees it could charge) at the
expense of out-of-state tort victims."t9
It follows that any state should be able to adopt unlimited shareholder
liability for corporate torts, either by legislation or by judicial decision, for
application to any tort claim to which the state's tort law applies, regardless
of the state of incorporation of the corporate defendant. For example, Illinois
should be able to adopt unlimited liability and apply it to a Massachusetts
shareholder of a Delaware corporation that commits a tort in Illinois without
being concerned whether either Delaware or Massachusetts had also adopted
unlimited liability. Moreover, under established conflict of laws doctrine, the
Illinois courts should be able to assert personal jurisdiction over the Massachu-
setts shareholders given that the substantive tort law in Illinois makes those
shareholders liable."' With unlimited liability, the situation would be no
different from the case of a resident of Massachusetts who is a partner in a
Delaware partnership that commits a tort in Illinois, or in general from any
situation in which an agent of a Massachusetts resident commits a tort in
Illinois in the course of serving the principal."'
Although such jurisdictional issues seem manageable within the United
States, they might cause more serious practical problems of enforcement in an
international context. In particular, suppose a firm incorporated in a foreign
country, with shareholders who are residents of that country, commits a tort
in the United States that results in damages exceeding the corporation's assets.
If that country does not itself adopt unlimited liability for corporate torts, then
the courts of that country might resist enforcing personal judgments against the
corporation's shareholders for the remainder of the damages. A country adopt-
ing such a posture might quickly become the home for many thinly capitalized
corporations undertaking hazardous activities in other nations, and at prices that
undercut those of any firm incorporated in a jurisdiction that recognizes unlimit-
ed liability.
This possibility must be taken seriously, and deserves to be examined in
greater detail than we can give it here. We note, however, that there are various
measures available at the state or federal level to deal with such forms of
international opportunism. These include, for example, denying the right to
109. Although it is arguable that, in general, competition among states for corporation charters creates
pressure toward efficiency in state corporation statutes, see Winter, State Law Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 L LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977), this is not the case where the costs of
inefficient law are borne by third parties, such as out-of-state tort victims. Thus, if state corporation law
could freely govern the extent of liability for corporate torts, Delaware would have a strong incentive to
amend its corporation statute to establish, say, a cap of $5,000 on any corporation's liability for any tort.
110. See Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations,
Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing, in general, when jurisdiction over one
defendant implies jurisdiction over a legally related party, such as a shareholder). For jurisdictional purposes,
the unlimited liability rule proposed here would in essence extend to all corporate torts the treatment of
shareholders that is currently found in those cases in which courts pierce the corporate veil.
111. Id. at 11, 16-19.
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conduct certain types of business within the United States to any firm incorpo-
rated in a nation that refuses to recognize unlimited liability for corporate torts,
or requiring the posting of bond or proof of adequate insurance for potential
tort damages by such a corporation before it can conduct business.
11 2
E. Prospectivity of Application
Unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts should presumably be
given only prospective and not retroactive application. Indeed, there is much
to be said for making unlimited liability applicable only for tort claims filed
no sooner than, say, two years after the date that the unlimited liability regime
is adopted. This timetable would permit individuals who currently hold poorly
diversified stock portfolios to diversify their holdings or to sell off their stock
holdings in individual companies and purchase mutual fund shares instead. It
would also provide an opportunity for corporations, and perhaps individuals,
to purchase the amount of insurance appropriate for the new regime. Making
unlimited shareholder liability applicable immediately, much less retroactively,
might impose large windfall losses on some small shareholders, and lead to
costly litigation to recover from the shareholders of corporations that are
currently poorly insured, while having no useful incentive effects that cannot
be obtained simply through prospective application.
V. EXPERIENCE wriH UNLIMITED LIABILITY
It is common today to think of limited liability as an integral part of the
corporate form and therefore to feel that abolishing limited liability, even in
tort, would be recklessly revolutionary. But limited liability in both tort and
contract evolved over the past 150 years and did not become universal even
in the United States until about fifty years ago.
112. Although, as we discuss below, see infra Part VI.A, we do not believe that mandatory insurance
is, in general, a sufficient substitute for unlimited liability, in this context it might serve adequately. The
object here would be to err on the high side-that is, to require that a corporation carry, not a "reasonable"
amount of insurance (which would be very hard to determine), but rather the amount of insurance necessary
to cover the maximum amount of damages it could likely cause. (To make this administrable, the insurance
requirement for a firm in a given industry might be stated as a given-very large-multiple of the gross
receipts that the firm receives in the jurisdiction.) The purpose of the requirement is not principally to make
the corporation purchase insurance, but rather to give it a strong incentive to waive limited liability by
incorporating in a jurisdiction that is willing to recognize personal judgments against shareholders for
corporate torts.
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A. Historical Developments
Blumberg has recently offered an extensive and thoughtful survey of the
historical experience with unlimited liability.1 3 As he points out, in England
prior to 1844, manufacturing firms had difficulty obtaining corporate charters.
Consequently, large manufacturing firms were commonly formed as unincorpo-
rated joint stock companies with transferable shares. Indeed, an active public
market in the shares of such companies developed as early as the seventeenth
century. These firms had roughly the legal characteristics of a large partnership,
including unlimited joint and several liability for all corporate obligations. Then,
between 1844 and 1855, joint stock companies were permitted to incorporate
but had to retain unlimited liability. Only after 1855 was incorporation with
limited liability generally available. Prior to 1855, joint stock companies
commonly sought to limit their shareholders' liability to voluntary creditors by
contractual means, thus providing evidence that limited liability is the appropri-
ate default rule for contractual obligations. Such devices presumably did not
succeed, however, in limiting liability in tort. Nevertheless, by 1844 there were
almost 1,000 joint stock companies in England, some with thousands of share-
holders.
114
Similarly, although American states freely granted corporate charters by the
beginning of the nineteenth century, for the first several decades of that century
a number of states imposed unlimited liability on manufacturing corporations.
Nevertheless, many manufacturing firms incorporated in this period. Moreover,
states that were slow in adopting limited liability, such as Massachusetts (1830)
and Rhode Island (1849), did not appear to suffer a conspicuous disadvantage
in industrial development in comparison to neighboring states, such as Connect-
icut and New Hampshire, that adopted limited liability earlier.115 And, al-
though most American states had adopted limited liability for corporations in
general by the 1850's, California imposed unlimited pro rata liability by statute
on the shareholders of both domestic and foreign corporations from statehood
in 1849 until 1931, evidently without crippling industrial and commercial
development. Even after discarding unlimited liability, many states provided
for double or triple shareholder liability for corporate debts throughout the nine-
teenth century-liability that, at least originally, extended to tort creditors as
well. Similarly, most states, as well as federal banking legislation, imposed
double liability on the shareholders of banks until the 1930's.116 An efficient
mechanism, in the form of a procedure in equity termed the "creditors' bill,"
ultimately evolved to provide a means for obtaining a collective judgment, good
113. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 1. Much of this material previously appeared in Blumberg, Limited
Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986).
114. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 9-23.
115. Id. at 23-38.
116. Id. at 42-49.
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against all shareholders, that was res judicata in other jurisdictions and subject
only to personal defenses such as the number of shares actually held." 7
This extensive experience suggests that a regime of unlimited liability is
administrable and that corporations with publicly-traded shares can survive and
prosper under it. Prospective shareholders will not all be scared away. To be
sure, tort liability for shareholders was evidently rare in the period involved.
But historically unlimited liability generally extended to contract as well as tort,
and contractual liability for shareholders was presumably a serious prospect.
Moreover, in the past, unlimited liability regimes for joint stock companies
often employed joint and several rather than pro rata liability. If such a regime
is viable, presumably a regime involving unlimited liability only in tort, and
with pro rata liability, is much more so.
B. What Does History Tell Us About Efficiency?
The fact that unlimited liability has existed and survived over relatively long
periods does not necessarily establish that it is efficient. Indeed, the ultimate
rejection of unlimited liability, in tort as well as in contract, might be taken as
evidence that it is an inferior rule. If, as argued here, unlimited shareholder
liability in tort may well be the efficient rule today, were most jurisdictions
simply mistaken in employing the contrary rule for the past century and a half?
Or could conditions somehow have changed in recent times?
The historical record does not answer these questions clearly. Evidently no
scholar has yet assembled sufficient evidence from past experiences with
unlimited liability to assess how difficult it was to administer or what its
practical incentive effects were relative to those of limited liability. Thus the
only clear conclusion that past experience permits is the observation that
extensive corporate development is at least compatible with unlimited liability.
There are, however, several reasons why the general rejection of unlimited
liability in tort after about 1850 should not be taken to indicate that it would
be inefficient today.
First, then as now, the law apparently failed to distinguish clearly between
tort and contract when it came to shareholder liability. Since contractual liability
was undoubtedly more important, the rule that was efficient for contract cred-
itors was, it appears, simply adopted for both, without much concern about the
possibility of distinguishing between the two. Indeed, in the past, limited
liability may not often have been an important issue in tort cases. Torts that
would bankrupt a publicly-traded firm were presumably rare. As noted in the
Introduction, such torts seem to be largely a modern phenomenon. Moreover,
where the corporate defendant was a closely-held firm, it may have been that
117. Id. at 52-53.
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major shareholders were often personally liable on the basis of their active
involvement in tortious conduct.
Second, limited liability became the prevailing rule in the United States long
before corporate subsidiaries were common or even, in general, legal."1 Yet
corporate subsidiaries are among the firms that are most likely to employ
limited liability today to externalize tort damages.
Third, both the capital markets and the insurance markets have matured
considerably over the past hundred years. Liability insurance was poorly
developed in the middle of the nineteenth century. Weak actuarial data and the
regionalism of insurance markets limited opportunities to diversify risks.119
Modem refinements in risk assessment, together with the nationalization and
internationalization of insurance markets, have presumably made corporate
liabilities much easier to insure. Similarly, the nationalization and international-
ization of stock markets, as well as the development of large intermediaries
such as pension funds and mutual funds, permit the securities markets to
diversify risk far better than they could in the past.
Finally, procedural reforms, improved communications, and improved
record-keeping undoubtedly make it proportionately less costly today than it
was 100 years ago to identify and collect judgments from all shareholders of
a given corporation as of a particular date.
VI. THE ALTERNATIVES TO UNLIMITED LIABILITY
Despite the attractions of unlimited liability as a means of regulating safety
and investment incentives, the possibility remains that alternative legal reforms
could achieve the same effects at lower cost. Indeed, most commentators who
question the incentive effects of limited liability recommend reforms short of
imposing unlimited liability on all shareholders. The most commonly mentioned
reforms fall into three categories: "coverage-oriented" reforms, which seek to
guarantee that firms have adequate resources to satisfy tort judgments; "liabili-
ty-shifting" reforms, which shift responsibility for the firm's excess tort liability
to contractual participants in the firm other than its shareholders; and "veil-
piercing" reforms, which broaden the categories of cases in which courts
disregard the corporate boundaries. Although all three genres of reform could
mitigate the perverse effects of limited liability, there are strong reasons to
believe that none would prove as effective as an unlimited liability regime.
118. See id. 58-62.
119. See Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual Versus Stock, I J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 125, 145-49 (1985).
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A. Coverage-Oriented Reforms
Coverage-oriented alternatives to unlimited liability include such simple
devices as establishing fixed insurance coverage or capitalization levels for
firms, which would then be enforced by holding corporate officers or directors
personally liable for a breach of the statutory norm. Putting aside for the
moment the potential enforcement problems,12 the obvious difficulty with
coverage rules is their inflexibility. No single coverage level would be satisfac-
tory across industries, firms of different sizes, or even production technologies.
Moreover, regulators would have great difficulty in acquiring the information
necessary to make fine-grained determinations of appropriate coverage levels,
particularly since the magnitude of potential tort losses would often change
rapidly over time with new technological developments. At best, then, fixed
coverage levels would become minimum coverage levels that would be keyed
to the smallest and safest firms in the relevant industry grouping. At worst, such
levels would become wholly irrelevant to the actual magnitude of tort losses,
as clearly happened in the infamous taxi cab cases.' In either case, fixed
coverage levels would be unlikely to change the basic incentive problems
associated with limited liability.
Even if it were possible to fix realistic insurance or capitalization levels,
moreover, many firms-and particularly many publicly-traded firms-would
be forced to bear unnecessary costs in attempting to maintain sufficient cover-
age levels to meet all possible tort judgments. By contrast, the firm's share-
holders will often be able to bear the risks of unusually large damages more
cheaply by employing the diversification potential of the securities market
themselves. Thus, a regime of unlimited liability has yet another important
flexibility advantage over mandatory coverage requirements: it permits the firm
and its shareholders to decide how much risk should be borne through insurance
or capitalization of the firm and how much should be borne directly by the
shareholders and the market.
This is not to deny that minimum capitalization and insurance requirements
may sometimes be appropriate. As discussed in Part I.C, such requirements
may be helpful in frustrating a high-roller strategy in specific industries. But,
even in these cases, minimum capitalization and insurance requirements are
more likely to be effective as a supplement to, rather than as a substitute for,
unlimited shareholder liability. If used as a supplement to unlimited liability,
such requirements could sharply reduce the supply of potential high-rolling
120. See infra Part VLB.
121. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966). In
Walkovszky and other taxi cab cases, courts have refused to pierce the corporate veil to hold the shareholders
of thinly-capitalized cab companies personally liable for the negligence of drivers. The cabs at issue are
invariably insured at the minimum level required by state law, but this level is typically a small fraction
of the actual loss occasioned by a serious traffic accident.
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owners by both (1) increasing the amount of personal assets a high roller must
wager to enter the industry and (2) decreasing a high roller's expected return
by increasing his prospective loss from an adverse tort judgment. To the extent
that high rollers are thus deterred, unlimited liability could then serve to assure
that the remaining better-financed owners in the industry would have the right
incentives to operate their firms efficiently.
The hazardous waste disposal industry offers evidence that such a combined
strategy can be effective. In the 1970's, this industry was characterized by
numerous small firms with minimal capitalization-that is, by a financial
structure that seemed transparently chosen to minimize liability.'1 Then, in
1976, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)'I imposed fi-
nancial responsibility requirements on the industry in the form of minimum
asset levels and/or liability insurance coverage, and also increased asset levels
by requiring firms to deploy capital-intensive technologies."2 Subsequently,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA)'15 extended liability to "owners" and "operators" of haz-
ardous waste facilities, which, in various circumstances, courts have interpreted
to include customers, lenders, corporate parents, and other affiliated actors
-hence imposing a diluted form of de facto unlimited liability.26 As a con-
sequence, subsidiarization has lost much of its value as a tactic for evading
liability.27 The combined effect has been to transform the industry into one
characterized by a smaller number of firms, each of which is relatively large
and has substantial equity capitalization. 1'8
B. Liability-Shifting Reforms
Similarly, alternatives to unlimited liability that would shift liability to
participants in the firm other than shareholders do not seem promising. One
commonly proposed alternative of this type would hold directors or controlling
officers personally liable for any portion of a tort judgment that exceeds the
firm's assets. 29 For smaller firms able to insure their expected tort losses,
this form of managerial liability would doubtless provide a powerful insurance
122. M. Lange, supra note 3, at 32-33.
123. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6920 et seq. (West Supp. 1990).
124. M. Lange, supra note 3, at 34.
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
126. See Dent, supra note 1; M. Lange, supra note 3, at 37, 55. In effect, the standards that the courts
have been using to extend liability to shareholders under CERCLA are essentially traditional tort principles.
Consequently, the jurisprudence developing under CERCLA is roughly the approach suggested above in
Part MA.
127. Hazardous waste disposal companies nevertheless continue to resort to subsidiarization, apparently
because parent companies may still be able to escape liability under current interpretations of CERCLA.
See M. Lange, supra note 3, at 53-55.
128. M. Lange, supra note 3, at 45-47. Dent, supra note 1, at 175, erroneously suggests that the effect
of expanded liability under CERCLA has been the reverse: to induce smaller scale and disaggregation.
129. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note I, at 149.
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incentive, much as imposing unlimited liability on shareholders might do.
Important difficulties would arise, however, if insurance were unavailable or
prospective tort losses were very large relative to the personal assets of the
liability targets. In the absence of insurance, imposing personal liability for the
firm's entire tort losses on its managers Would create a powerful incentive to
overinvest in safety measures or, what is more likely, to resign.30 Alterna-
tively, if potential tort losses were quite large relative to personal assets, this
rule might generate the opposite incentive: in exchange for a very high salary,
a manager might be willing to have his firm undertake extremely risky activities
because he would be judgment proof in the event of an accident.
Liability-shifting and coverage-oriented reforms might be combined by
holding directors or officers personally liable for the excess tort liability of the
corporation only if they failed to obtain an "adequate" level of liability insur-
ance for the firm.13' This alternative would induce insurance coverage even
more directly than would unlimited liability. Its obvious lacuna, however, is
that it could not easily reach large losses and risky activities for which insur-
ance is now difficult to obtain. If generous insurance coverage were required
by the rule, many firms for which insurance is presently inefficient due to moral
hazard would be forced to purchase it nonetheless (or go out of business);
consequently, many firms would overinsure and safety precautions might
actually decline as a result of moral hazard. By contrast, if insurance were not
required where it is presently unavailable, the rule would have no effect on the
safety and investment incentives of precisely those firms that would be likely
to externalize very large tort costs. Moreover, where expected tort losses were
large, a tort of negligent underinsurance would invite the same kind of evasion
by judgment-proof managers that might be expected if directors or officers were
directly assessable for the firm's excess tort liability. 32
Another proposed risk-shifting alternative to unlimited liability would be
to change priority rules in bankruptcy to allow tort claimants to collect ahead
of some or all contract creditors.1 3 Like the previous alternatives, this reform
would presumably act as an insurance inducement. If insurance were unavail-
able, however, this reform would enlist secured creditors-for small firms,
typically banks or finance companies-as surrogate monitors and risk bearers
on behalf of tort victims. For many closely-held firms, such a rule might be
more efficient than unlimited shareholder liability. Nevertheless, the advantages
130. These considerations would also preclude a much more radical effort to offset the incentive effects
of limited liability through criminal sanctions imposed on corporate officers and directors. Managerial
liability-including criminal liability-may be necessary to deter serious, low-visibility corporate offenses.
Yet sanctions directed at individual managers are far too costly to substitute on a wholesale basis for the
basic tort liability of the firm. For development of this point, see Kraakman, supra note 39, at 869-71.
131. See D. Leebron, supra note 1, at 56-8.
132. A further problem with this reform lies in defining "reasonable" insurance coverage. A market
test of reasonable coverage suffers from the drawback that existing coverage levels interact with settlement
levels. Firms insure not against tort judgments but against likely settlement levels.
133. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.4 (1986); D. Leebron, supra note 1, at 58-63.
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of this rule do not require the legislative change in bankruptcy law that its
proponents advocate. Secured creditors are always free to waive their priority
in bankruptcy over tort claimants. Under an unlimited liability regime, share-
holders who would benefit from such a waiver would have an incentive to
negotiate for it. Indeed, given the impossibility of predicting which participants
in the firm will be superior risk bearers, it seems preferable to begin by impos-
ing unlimited liability on shareholders and leave the ultimate ordering of
priorities to the parties themselves. As we have suggested above, the legal
reform that is most likely to achieve this objective is one that joins unlimited
liability with a background priority rule in which all contract creditors take
precedence over tort claimants. Such a regime would give shareholders the
maximum flexibility to reallocate tort risks among participants in the firm in
the most efficient manner possible.
134
A similar but more extreme liability-shifting alternative to unlimited share-
holder liability is to impose residual tort liability on a subset of the firm's
lenders. To a degree, this strategy has been applied to the hazardous wastes
industry under CERCLA.135 When pushed to its logical limits, lenders become
insurers for the firm's tort liability under such a strategy-and the insurance
policies they must offer have no coverage limits. Although that may be efficient
in some circumstances, it is unlikely to be efficient in general.1 36 By contrast,
as just noted, unlimited shareholder liability might also encourage lenders to
assume liability voluntarily, but it would do so only in those cases in which
lenders are more efficient risk-bearers than shareholders.
To be sure, shareholders who are judgment proof would have no incentive
to pay lenders to assume liability voluntarily, even under unlimited liability.
In such circumstances, mandatory lender liability may sometimes increase
efficiency, either by inducing a lender to police the firm's insurance coverage
or by leading it to withhold credit from an overly risky firm that should be
forced out of business entirely. But any gains in such cases must be balanced
against the costs of inefficiently impairing access to credit for all those firms
whose lenders are not efficient bearers of tort risks. Moreover, other methods
seem likely to be more effective in controlling firms with judgment-proof
shareholders. One such method, already discussed, is to impose minimal
capitalization and/or insurance requirements on firms in specific industries in
which the high-roller strategy is particularly prevalent. Another method is to
impose liability on other firms besides lenders that contract with the firm in
question-such as the firm that produces the toxic chemicals transported by a
134. See supra Part II.A.3.
135. See Toulme & Cloud, The Fleet Factors Case: A Wrong Turn for Lender Liability Under
Superfund, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 127 (1991).
136. To a degree, this approach simply forces firms to maintain adequate capitalization and/or insurance
in order to obtain credit, and to this extent may be salutary. But, since unlimited liability insurance is
generally unavailable to firms, this approach may often require that lenders bear a degree of residual liability
that, for reasons of both moral hazard and risk-bearing, is inefficient.
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thinly capitalized trucking company (a strategy that is also adopted by
CERCLA 137).
C. Veil-Piercing Reforms
Finally, rather than going so far as to abolish limited liability in general,
many commentators find it tempting to move only part way to unlimited
liability by simply broadening the class of cases in which the courts pierce the
corporate veil. At present, the boundaries of that class are quite narrow and the
doctrine that determines those boundaries is vague and largely unprincipled.
1 38
Thus, to take one example, it has been suggested that many of the worst
cases of opportunistic manipulation of limited liability could be frustrated
simply by making parent corporations liable for the torts of their subsidiar-
ies.1 39 Yet any such partial reform is likely to prove quite unsatisfactory be-
cause it will create obvious incentives and opportunities for evasion. For
example, abolishing limited liability simply for wholly-owned subsidiaries
would create an incentive for a parent corporation to distribute to other share-
holders some small amount-say five percent-of its subsidiary's stock in order
to be able to invoke limited liability. Thus it would presumably be necessary
to extend such a rule to make parents liable also for the torts of firms in which
the parent holds a large fraction of the stock. But how large a fraction? Any-
thing over fifty percent? Then how about the case of the parent that owns only
forty-nine percent of the stock of another firm but effectively controls the latter
firm since the rest of the stock is widely held? t4
To avoid the latter difficulty, one might be tempted to go even further and
decide, for example, that pro rata unlimited liability should be extended to all
corporate shareholders in a corporate tortfeasor, but that shareholders who are
individuals should be left with limited liability. Yet this approach would create
a strong incentive for large firms to sell off their hazardous activities to small
publicly-traded corporations that are thinly capitalized, thus losing economies
of scale and incurring the agency problems that accompany diffuse ownership
while failing to improve, and perhaps even reducing, incentives to take efficient
137. M. LANGE, supra note 3, at 37.
138. See, e.g., R. CLARK, supra note 133, at 71-85; Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 371 (1981); Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry,
55 DENVER LJ. 1 (1978).
139. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, supra note I (suggesting denial of limited liability for subsidiaries within
"corporate groups"); D. Leebron, supra note I (advocating retention of limited liability except in the case
of "subsidiary corporations").
140. Note, supra note 1, proposes that unlimited liability be extended to all closely-held corporations
with 25 or fewer shareholders, where "shareholder" means a person holding at least one percent or $10,000
of the corporation's stock. Adoption of such a rule would, obviously, just lead to the formation of large
numbers of risky firms with 26 shareholders.
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precautions. The result would be a disaggregation of industry far more severe
than is likely to arise under a general scheme of unlimited liability.
141
In short, it is very difficult to determine where to drive the piton into this
particular slippery slope. Any intermediate stopping point will be arbitrary and
will provide a strong incentive for many corporations to position themselves
just on the far side of that point, thus distorting the organization of enterprise
while still permitting substantial externalization of costs. The only coherent and
effective approach is to go all the way and adopt a general rule of unlimited
liability.
In practice, it seems unlikely that shareholders of a publicly-traded firm
would often bear personal liability for corporate torts under a general regime
of unlimited liability. In most cases, the doctrine would only reach shareholders
of closely-held firms and, in particular, the corporate parents of subsidiaries.
But it is essential that unlimited liability be a general rule that extends in
principle to publicly-traded firms as well. Otherwise, evasion of liability
through partial or complete sales of risky subsidiaries to individual shareholders
will undermine the benefits of unlimited liability and bring the additional costs
of inefficient ownership structures.
Moreover, veil-piercing is itself simply a form of unlimited liability. To
decide that there are any circumstances in which shareholders can be held liable
for tort damages even though the formalities of the corporate form have been
observed is to discard limited liability in principle. The issue that remains is
simply to decide in which particular cases, and for how much, shareholders are
to be held personally liable. And for this purpose, as we have emphasized, any
arbitrary line between corporations in which shareholders can be held personally
liable in tort and those in which they cannot-whether between subsidiaries and
nonsubsidiaries or between closely-held and publicly-traded firms-will create
unnecessary and costly problems. Rather, as soon as one has recognized that
shareholders can be personally liable for corporate torts in principle, one is
logically driven to employ general principles of tort law-rather than formalities
of corporate structure-to determine the scope of their potential liability.
In sum, the distinction between "liberalized veil-piercing" and "unlimited
liability" is largely rhetorical. And while the former term is reassuringly
conservative, it also disguises, and threatens to mislead, the doctrinal evolution
at stake.
VII. CONCLUSION
To investigate the case for retaining a rule of limited shareholder liability
for corporate torts, this Article has systematically explored the characteristics
and policy advantages of a plausible alternative regime: a rule of pro rata
141. See supra Part II.C.
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shareholder liability for corporate torts. Our analysis indicates that the most
common arguments offered on behalf of limited liability-arguments that turn
on characteristics that are specific to corporate tortfeasors and the special
concerns of corporate law-are largely unpersuasive. There is no reason to
suppose that unlimited liability would discourage shareholder investment except
in firms that, under the prevailing norms of tort law, impose net costs on
society. Even in the case of publicly-held corporations, unlimited liability would
not burden the capital markets except, again, to the extent that it would lower
share prices to reflect the full social costs of corporate activities. Moreover,
nothing about the ownership structure of the corporation, including the larger
publicly-held corporation, presents insurmountable obstacles to the judicial
administration of an unlimited liability rule. Although a workable rule would
call for a number of refinements to accommodate the exigencies of freely-
trading shares, our preliminary sketch of a regime of unlimited liability suggests
many of the appropriate adaptations. Thus, if the case for limited liability turned
exclusively on questions of corporate structure or finance, we would conclude
without hesitation that this rule ought to be abandoned in favor of the basic
policy goals of the tort system. Although adjustments in liability rules or
damage awards might be merited under a regime of unlimited liability, they
should be guided by the deterrence and risk-sharing aims of tort law rather than
by the default rule that corporate law establishes to govern relationships be-
tween the firm and its contract creditors.
Even after discounting the conventional corporate law claims, however,
there remain several arguments for limited liability. The first of these arguments
is that shareholders, no less than other potential tort defendants, may attempt
to evade tort liability by hiding assets or by exploiting the limitations on
personal liability offered by bankruptcy law. To the extent that shareholders
successfully resort to evasion strategies under a regime of unlimited liabili-
ty-for example, by selling risky assets to highly leveraged individuals-they
might not only blunt the incentive effects of tort liability but also impose other
social costs, such as the loss of capable management or valuable integration
efficiencies. The second noncorporate argument supporting limited liability is
a conflict of law issue: without careful attention to extraterritorial enforcement,
it would not be easy to implement unlimited liability in one jurisdiction while
other jurisdictions retained a limited liability rule. Finally, the third noncorpo-
rate argument on behalf of limited liability is one that is seldom made explicitly
but, we suspect, is widely credited nonetheless. This is the claim that limited
liability is a necessary check on the expansionist tendencies of the courts in
deploying liability rules.
It is the cumulative force of these arguments, rather than issues peculiar to
the corporate form, that makes the choice between limited and unlimited
liability regimes a difficult one. Although we lack the detailed statistical and
case studies that one would like to make policy in an area such as this, at
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present none of these concerns seems, upon close examination with the evi-
dence at hand, sufficiently serious to justify the retention of limited liability.
While we cannot claim to have demonstrated conclusively the superiority of
unlimited liability, we believe we have exposed the weakness of existing
justifications for limited liability. If there remain reasons for retaining the
limited liability regime, the burden is on the proponents of that regime to
provide a persuasive exposition of those reasons.
